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ABSTRACT

TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
LESSONS FROM ECUADOR
Isabella Christensen
May 12, 2007

The transnational advocacy campaign against Ecuador’s second oil-transporting
pipeline, the Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado, had no impact on that state’s endorsement of
the project and only a negligible effect on related social and environmental policies. This
outcome is at odds with the theoretical formulation advanced by Keck and Sikkink which
holds that certain transnational advocacy campaigns can act as agents of state-level policy
changes. While Keck and Sikkink locate causal variables of campaign outcome on the
levels of the campaign and the state, the Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado case signals the
need to further incorporate international-level analysis and to investigate the implications
of this third dimension for transnational advocacy campaign outcome. The case study
presented herein suggests that theories of transnational advocacy sacrifice predictive
power by ignoring the extent to which international economic and political structures can
shape the preferences of states.
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INTRODUCTION

Transnational advocacy network theorists have developed a rich literature that
attends to the network or its immediate (domestic) target. Intensive focus on these levels
of analysis has translated into a wealth of writings on the emergence and sustainability of
campaigns, the constructive dynamics of campaigns, and challenges presented by
grassroots campaigning to democratic consolidation, for example. While theorists
generally expect that actors from the international community will intervene in disputes
between state and sub-state actors, few writers treat seriously this “third actor.” Rather, it
often seems that transnational advocacy scholars have simply transplanted social
movement theories to the international level without accounting for the additional
dimension and attendant interaction dynamics. Efforts to graft social movement theories
onto the international level have contributed to a static and superficial understanding of
the potential impact of international-level actors on campaign outcome.
There are good reasons to remedy this lopsided approach. Disregard for the
pivotal international actor has undermined the predictive power and therefore the utility
of these theories. Furthermore, examination of the significance of international actors will
encourage penetrating questions about the foundations and characteristics of the current
global system, both political and economic, and the implications of its structure for the
practice and conception of transnational advocacy.
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The aim of this thesis is to build on existing transnational advocacy literature by
further incorporating international-level actors and by arguing that transnational
advocacy practice and theory must confront the complexities of the international political
economy. The first step towards this goal is to present the reader with a brief review of
the principal findings of this theoretical approach as they were developed by Keck and
Sikkink in Activists Beyond Borders. Theoretical discussion will be followed by a case
study application with the purpose of demonstrating the predictive deficiencies of
campaign-level analysis. A transnational campaign focused on Ecuador and its petroleum
industry will serve here as the case study. This narrative will be presented in two parts in
order facilitate separate examinations of the campaign’s origin and outcome; analysis of
relevant theoretical and methodological considerations will follow each part. The
concluding sections will comment on the value and possible directions of future research.
A transnational campaign that aims to induce a norm shift on the national level is
unlikely to succeed if the desired outcome substantially challenges dominant international
values and the political structures that support them. In the end, specific, internationallevel constellations of costs and benefits associated with a target’s response to campaign
demands would seem to have as much to do with the outcome as campaign execution, the
quality of the network or the nature of the campaign issue. With this in mind, it is
reasonable to ponder the significance of the global political economy for transnational
activism in general; certainly, this is one factor that is common to all transnational
campaigns, and as such it provides a jumping-off point for future research into the
viability of this approach.
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ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
A Brief Introduction to Dominant Theoretical Concepts

The term ‘Transnational Action Network’ or TAN, was adopted by Margaret
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 book, Activists Beyond Borders. In this wellreceived work, the authors used the term to refer to any network, or loose and fluid
configuration, of activists who, whether tied primarily to national or international
political arenas, collaborate in order to convince national governments to comply with
activists’ demands and, by extension, with international norms and democratic principles.
Humanitarian border-crossing was not, in 1998, a new phenomenon, but Keck and
Sikkink were able to distill from the long history of TAN practice a fresh theoreticallybased understanding of the dynamics of TANs. Their discussion was compelling enough
to inspire reactions from numerous scholars across disciplines, greatly expanding this
body of political science research while also preserving its distinct in its blending of
domestically-oriented Social Movement and International Relations theories and its
unapologetically normative bent. The principal endeavors of this literature have been to
1) define this brand of activism by identifying the actors, strategies and goals involved
and, 2) develop a theory that accounts for the variation in outcome of such activism. This
brief introductory review of the literature treats Keck and Sikkink’s formulation as
representative of the literature at large; more recent formulations can be approached as
variations on their theme.
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Two years after its publication, Activists Beyond Borders earned Margaret Keck
and Kathryn Sikkink the 2000 Grawemeyer Prize for Ideas Improving World Order.1 As
the title of the award suggests, this work is decidedly focused on the potential of
normative political activism for affecting social and political change on an international
scale. In essence, Keck and Sikkink argue that there exists a community of activists that
utilizes both domestic and foreign resources to induce national governments to abandon
certain policies and positions deemed repressive, undemocratic, or otherwise ethically
unacceptable. As such, the authors argue, this specific form of activism has great
potential for transforming state behavior since domestic policy alignment with
international norms is expected to lead to internalization of the preferred orientation.
The authors discuss the normative beliefs that underpin the existence and actions
of a TAN: participants’ goals, the constructive effects of normative work on the
emergence and development of a TAN or of a single campaign, and so on. They link this
discussion to a consideration of the types of soft and normative-based power (or
“politics”) that TANs can draw on in the absence of traditional hard power:
Informational, Symbolic, Leverage, or Accountability. In case-study format, they
describe the current and recent campaigns of the TANs concerned with the three most
popular issue areas: human rights, women’s rights, and environmental rights.
Significantly, the authors offer a number of definitions that, in comparison to earlier
related literature, are quite broad. Thus, a TAN is described as any group having
members from at least two different countries, where at least one of these is an
international actor and where organization is motivated by mutually held principles and
values.
1

Grawemeyer Award, 1
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The book succinctly describes the patterns that characterize the interactions
between TAN actors; the most successful and common of these being referred to as the
“boomerang.” In this particular pattern, domestic activists, unable to access or influence
their national government, seek out an international ally who is able and willing to
project their message in a compelling and effective manner to the international
community. Actors from this broader community then attempt to use their leverage in
order to petition the unresponsive national government to address the grievances of the
domestic activists. Historically, boomerang patterns of activism have had varying
success; the failure rate of transnational action network campaigns is high.
In fact, Tarrow finds that, in general, “transnational intervention fails more often
than it succeeds.”2 Given this tendency towards negative campaign outcomes, the ability
to identify the factors that determine variation in outcome is central to the development of
a comprehensive theory. This is also a matter of potential interest to the network actors,
as they stand to gain significantly from being able to assess, in advance of its initiation,
the chances of success of any single campaign. As Keck and Sikkink note, the costs of
organizing and acting on the transnational level are enormous so that, while the logic
behind the formation of a transnational action network is likely of an altruistic nature, the
activists that create them are prone to think strategically about their humanitarian efforts.
Keck and Sikkink, adopting an exploratory approach in order to identify the
reasons for success or failure in a number of empirical cases, find that their dependent
variable (campaign outcome) is determined by four independent variables.
The first of these concerns the characteristics of the state being targeted by the
campaign. The authors expect success to be most likely when the targeted state is
2

Tarrow, 2005, 200
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responsive to pressure. Lobbying from within the state is most likely to be effective in a
democratic, rather than authoritarian, domestic context. External influence is most likely
to achieve results when the targeted state’s position in the international system makes it
vulnerable. Various conditions might heighten vulnerability: if a state is party to
international agreements, is seeking to maintain or increase its access to the international
market, is seeking recognition as a democratic state, or generally stands to gain or lose
economic opportunities as a consequence of its international reputation. The authors state
“Vulnerability arises both from the availability of leverage and the target’s sensitivity to
leverage; if either is missing, a campaign may fail.”3
The second independent variable concerns the specific manner in which a
campaign is cast; Keck and Sikkink write at length of the importance of strategic issue
framing and resonance. A frame, or conceptual presentation, is most likely to succeed
when it is presented in a manner that makes explicit that 1) there is a right and a wrong
side between which the public must choose, 2) the problem is not naturally occurring, but
rather a result of human action and intent 3) there is, consequently, someone who bears
the blame for the creation of the problem and, 4) the stakes of campaign success are high,
as in a life-or-death outcome for innocent victims. The frame is selected in order to
achieve maximum issue resonance, meaning that the intended audience will experience
empathy with the victims and a desire to engage personally with the campaign.
The third independent variable concerns the publics’ perception of the activists
themselves. In order to be effective, the activists must be seen as truthful reporters and
trustworthy messengers. The public must believe that activists are legitimate
representatives of the victims; this is particularly important in those circumstances under
3

Keck and Sikkink, 29
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which a first-world activist claims to act on behalf of a third-world victim. Relationships
between activists must be transparent and unproblematic.
The final causal variable concerns the quality of the network itself. Keck and
Sikkink emphasize that the size and the density of a network are directly related to its
ability to conduct a successful campaign or bring pressure to bear on the targeted state.
Size of a network simply refers to the number of members it claims. Density, a more
complex concept, is the measure of the number, quality and strength of the ties that exist
between network members. Such ties allow for smooth transfer of resources, coordination
of action, information dissemination, and access to powerful potential allies. Size and
density are related concepts in so far as changes in one measure can be expected to have
an impact on the other.
That three of the four independent variables focus on the network and its
campaign clearly indicates that Keck and Sikkink find outcome to be primarily dependent
on campaign-level factors. The fourth independent variable concerns the vulnerability of
the target to international-level actors that are in alliance with the TAN; the authors do
not consider that these actors might work to oppose the TAN or to shield the target from
TAN pressure. They also neglect to discuss whether networks can create an ally where
there is none, or bolster it where it is insufficiently powerful vis-à-vis the target.
Generally, Keck and Sikkink do not consider the complexity of the international scheme
or its component parts. The reason for their intense focus on campaign-level factors can
be found in the conclusion of their work wherein the authors discuss the ways in which
their theory is distinct from Liberalism.
The authors acknowledge that both theoretical perspectives allow that individuals
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can act as the “motor of change,” and enjoy a notable degree of influence on the national
and international level.4 According to Keck and Sikkink, Liberalism holds that
individuals structure the preferences of (democratic) states and, by extension, impact
inter-state interaction. However, these individuals’ behaviors are informed by risk-averse
self-interest, and not principles or values, and so cannot explain how individuals might
influence other self-interested individual-level actors to adopt a position similar to their
own. In essence, Liberalism holds that change occurs via a one-way vertical structure of
influence and communication that links sub-state to state levels and state to international
levels.
In contrast, theories of transnational network advocacy envision that horizontal
contact is established between actors, frequently as a result of already-existing
complimentary values. However, where similar values do not yet exist, a network can
facilitate communication between actors; such exchanges have a constructivist effect on
network participants that speeds the development of shared values. Essentially, the
authors imagine that self-interest is necessarily tied to a specific context while certain
values are potentially universal, located in the individual and rather than in a particular
political or social context. Communicating these values to others can trigger mobilization
around shared principles and, where a state resists actors’ attempts to influence its
preferences from within then coordination between the network and a power-wielding
ally on the international level can structure state preference from without.
It follows from this theoretical foundation that the character of the network is of
utmost importance, since only a network can facilitate constructivist exchanges and then
only under certain conditions. Of secondary importance is the character of the state;
4

Keck and Sikkink, 213
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democracy allows for influence from within while the absence of democracy can lead to
efforts to influence state preferences form without. Lagging far behind are network allies
originating in the level of the international system. Their origins, characters, preferences
remain a mystery. To a great degree, the authors leave to chance the probability that a
network will secure international-level leverage that is both powerful and relevant
enough to restructure the target’s preferences and thereby consolidate change.

9

TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM IN ECUADOR:
AN OVERVIEW

In August of 2003, the Ecuadorian government announced the completion of the
Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado [Heavy Crude Pipeline, or OCP], Ecuador’s second oiltransporting pipeline. The government, the project financiers and the oil industry praised
its modern technological features that, they claimed, would minimize the pipeline’s
environmental and social impacts. A network of environmental and human rights activists
from the international, national, regional and local arenas rejected this claim and assailed
the government’s decision to construct the OCP.
Such wildly contrasting claims are common to the debate over oil activity in
Ecuador. Oil exploration and exploitation activities have grown steadily in scope and
frequency since Texaco’s 1964 discovery of reserves in the eastern Amazon. Anti-oil
activism began in the 1970s and increased in intensity and prevalence in the mid 1980s.
Indigenous activism also began in the 1970s with the opposition by the Shuar nation to
the oil industry’s presence on their traditional lands and, by the early 1990s, gained
sufficient momentum to constitute a powerful, national-level social movement with a
political wing. Given the 30-year history of oil industry and opposition in Ecuador, it is
not premature to ask whether and how the state has adjusted its national environmental
and social policies over time and in response to transnational activism.
Comparison of the policies that governed the construction of the country’s two
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pipelines facilitates just such a longitudinal investigation. These two projects, sitting as
brackets around three decades of oil activity in Ecuador, and were the products of very
different policy environments. The first of these, the Sistema de Oleoducto TransEcuatoriano [Transecuadorian Pipeline System, or SOTE], was constructed in 1969. In
every respect, the SOTE project is a prime example of decision-making in an
unconstrained policy environment, in which policies were created and adopted in
complete absence of governmental or citizen regulation and oversight. The design
process and initial construction phases of the SOTE predated the passage of Ecuador’s
first national laws regulating petroleum activities. It also preceded the arrival of
international human rights and environmental organizations to Ecuador, and the
formation of their national counterparts. Not surprisingly, neither the pace of construction
nor the methods and materials employed reflected then-current industry standards or
technological capabilities.5 The SOTE project is the historical precursor of the second
pipeline and its attendant policy environment, and serves as an example of the nature and
impact of unconstrained state decision-making.
In contrast, the OCP was the subject of intense debate lasting more than one
decade. Policy negotiations date to 1989 when oil companies holding new exploration
and exploitation contracts in Ecuador suggested to the government that the SOTE would
be incapable of transporting future increases in production. During the protracted debate,
a multiplicity of actors voiced their positions within a formally democratic national
context, as each sought to influence the policy environment that prevailed during the
conception and construction of the OCP. A number of these actors collaborated to form
an advocacy network that sought to mobilize international and domestic support for its
5

Aguinda v Texaco, 1993.
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anti-OCP position.
The state also took an active and visible role in the debate, particularly during the
five-year period between the planning and design phases and the completion of the OCP.
In many ways, it would seem that the state broke with its traditional disregard for
environmental dimensions of national development policy. For example, it adopted a
number of new environmental policy norms, required Environmental Impact Assessments
(EIAs) from OCP Consortium members, established monitoring mechanisms, and
expanded the institutional framework in support of these new responsibilities. The state
also modified its position on the indigenous question; in 1990, for example, the state
transferred the legal title to more than 3 million acres of land in the Amazonian Basin to
indigenous communities.6
The question is whether these individual policies were indicative of the broader
environmental and social orientation of the state and if they were formulated in response
and accordance to the demands of the TAN. The conclusion is that, despite a marked
difference in the salience of environmental and social issues during the policy
development stages in the two cases, the government ignored TAN demands by refusing
to prioritize the environmental and social dimensions of the OCP project. Thus, the TAN
did not influence the normative or policy positions of the state in regards to the OCP.
Rather, the Ecuadorian state continued to circumvent the requirements of its own national
laws, undermine the capacity of domestic institutional mechanisms for regulation and
enforcement, discount its obligations under international agreements and dismiss the
recommendations of international experts and activists. In short, the TAN was ineffective
since its OCP campaign can be classified as a failure.
6

Farah, 1
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Analysis of the effects of the policy environments surrounding the two projects
will go forth in a loosely comparative fashion. Since the Ecuadorian case is intended to
serve as a partial test of Keck and Sikkink’s theoretical approach and predictions,
discussion on the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of Activists Beyond
Borders will be interspersed with the presentation and analysis of empirical findings. The
goal will be to show that the Ecuadorian case seriously challenges several central
theoretical claims and methodological approaches of the literature, and to explore the
reasons and potential remedies for this disjuncture between theory and empirical
observation.
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CASE ANALYSIS:
Methods and Caveats

The Ecuadorian case unfolds over a period of thirty years. With the benefit of
substantial room to practice hindsight, it will readily become clear that SOTE policies
caused alarming environmental degradation and dislocating social effects. Unfortunately,
the results of state policies during the OCP era are less clear. This is primarily due to the
simple fact that few years have elapsed since the completion of the OCP: environmental
impact might be latent, and the research community has had little time to perform and
publish environmental assessments of the project in its operational stage. Such
asymmetry points to the need to account for time issues in the research design. Pierson
finds that institutional change and maturation are not quick processes, where they occur
at all. The appropriate time frame for evaluation is furthermore related to the
measurement of effectiveness applied in evaluating the outcome.
Keck and Sikkink do not provide measurements for or definitions of
effectiveness. Instead, they treat effectiveness as a fluid concept best specified on a percampaign basis and in relation to the goals of that campaign. Thus, the authors state that

Activists in advocacy networks are concerned with political effectiveness. Their
definition of effectiveness often includes some policy change by ‘target actors’
such as governments, international financial institutions like the World Bank, or
private actors like transnational corporations.7
7

Keck and Sikkink, 23.
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Accordingly, effectiveness can be evaluated by simply determining whether a
target has responded to a TAN campaign with some change in policy. The case of the
Ecuadorian TAN indicates that the government and Texaco were targeted, but neither
responded to activist demands (for sustainable pipeline construction or a moratorium) by
systematically altering policy. By Keck and Sikkink’s criteria, three decades of TAN
activism in Ecuador have been completely ineffective.
Some authors suggest that assessment of the effectiveness of an organization
should be based not on the achievement of its goals but on the structure and strategy of
the organization itself. Sowa et al. support this approach, suggesting that the management
of a certain organization is key, that outcomes may be objective or perceptual or both,
and that corresponding distinctions are needed in order to identify, operationalize and test
the outcome.8 Laraia goes a step further to argue that the measure, the unit of analysis and
the predicted effectiveness are interrelated; she presents a table (roughly reproduced here)
that shows three possible approaches to these integrated elements:

Measure:
capacity
Unit of Analysis: structure
Predicting:
performance

performance
process
achievement

achievement
outcome
survivability

Thus, the measurement of effectiveness can change, so long as the unit of
analysis, the predictive goal, and the unit of measurement vary correspondingly.9 This
idea approaches a more realistic acknowledgment of complexity of TAN goals (targeted
practices that are connected to other elements of societal ordering) and network structure
(the multiplicity of actors, motivations, culture-specific practices, and funding sources)

8
9

Sowa et al., 715, 720.
Laraia, 758.
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than does the guideline offered by Keck and Sikkink.
Where policy change constitutes effectiveness, per Keck and Sikkink’s
recommendation, the definitional scope depends on whether one most values a simple
(revocable) policy change, institutionalization of a policy change (provisions for
enforcement and funding), or a fundamental and general norm shift. The flexibility of
Laraia’s conceptualization notwithstanding, one may well question the value of defining
effectiveness as a shift in policy without distinguishing between policy formulation and
implementation, and without specifying a time frame for assessing the degree of
implementation. For example, Arsel questions whether the ‘freezing’ of the Akkuyu
nuclear power plant proposal, which enjoyed the full support of the Turkish government,
“qualifies the networks as a success story?”10 He concludes that it is “premature” to
assume that a freeze of the proposal is equivalent to a long-term re-orientation on the part
of the government, and states, generally, that policy shifts are “best interpreted as a shortterm strategic victory.”11 In making this argument, Arsel puts forth an insightful
observation about the significance of “negative versus affirmative” success, saying that,
The impact from the advocacy efforts may be time delayed. Negative success, the
freezing of the Akkuyu project for instance, is often half the story. To sustain such
a decision, major policy shifts need to take place and new alliances need to be
made.12
With this is counsel mind, it is reasonable to argue that, where policy outcome is
to be the focus for evaluating TAN effectiveness, then effectiveness should be gauged by,
at a minimum, the following standards: 1) in comparison to other theoretically possible
results, 2) in terms of the durability of the result, as seen in efforts to enforce or

10

Arsel, 2; 8.
Arsel, 2; 8.
12
Arsel, 8.
11
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institutionalize the achievement, and 3) in terms of the scope of the impact, i.e., whether
its application is issue-specific or represents a fundamental norm shift.
Applying these criteria, it is clear that the OCP campaign failed to prevent the
construction of the pipeline and had little or no impact on policies governing its design,
construction, or operation. However, the campaign did cause the state to make small
adjustments to its policies concerning the secondary environmental and social impacts of
the pipeline; while these were issue-specific, they have thus far been enforced. On
balance, the campaign was completely ineffective but the TAN can be credited with small
achievements.
Where it is relevant, institutional change made during the 1970s is considered a
completed process, while institutional adjustments made during the 1990s is regarded as
provisional and inconclusive. It is also reasonable to expect that environmental and
institutional lessons learned from the SOTE era might have been applied during the OCP
era; a temporal analysis should ask whether and how institutional learning has occurred.
For these reasons, it is appropriate to place greatest emphasis on the outcomes of the
SOTE case: the environmental impacts that have been observed and an understanding of
their origins and implications. Conversely, it is most reasonable to focus on policy
development stages in the OCP case: design and siting of the pipeline, treatment of
relevant scientific information and evidence of learning, and the influence of a
democratic national context.
It is important, particularly since I will emphasize different aspects of the two
projects, that some elements are held constant. To this end, both case study discussions
will be structured by a focus on two categories: Actors and Institutional Capacity, and
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Social and Environmental Impact. The first category (Actors and Institutional Capacity)
encompasses those factors most salient to the development of policy: who influenced the
pipeline agenda and how; and, whether the state had, or attempted to establish, the
capacity to manage social and environmental issues through legislation, monitoring, and
enforcement. It is important to consider both the state’s preferred procedural and
normative position, and scrutinize its efforts to ensure sufficient institutional capacity in
support of its stated goals.
The second category (Social and Environmental Impact) describes the direct and
indirect outcomes of policy decisions. This is accomplished by asking: what impacts
followed directly from the design and management of the pipelines; and what cumulative
impacts are associated with the pipeline projects? In answering these questions, it is
helpful to investigate the policy provisions for community consultation, physical design,
construction processes, and siting decisions, monitoring mechanisms and emergency
contingency plans.

18

CASE ANALYSIS:
Empirical Challenges
Four features common to both pipeline project eras have complicated the state’s
role in and responsibility for environmental stewardship and minority rights provision.
The first of these factors concerns the national political landscape. Prior to and during the
SOTE period, a series of military governments and coup-based power transitions defined
the makeup and nature of the state. Junta governments typically governed by decree, and
tended to insulate the country from certain external influences, like non-governmental
scientists and activists. Military governments predicated internal legitimacy on successful
economic policies, which commonly translated into resource-intensive development
schemes.
Democratic constitutional rule, reestablished in the 1980s, did little to restrain the
armed forces or lengthen political time horizons. Presidential instability and the
occasional disbanding of Congress and the Supreme Court have encouraged volatile
policy shifts and created an inhospitable environment for institutional maturation. Not
surprisingly, state agencies hold conflicting and frequently-shifting mandates for policy
implementation, oversight and enforcement. These effects are compounded by a highly
fragmented party system that results in frequent governmental gridlock. The short
political timeframes common to all Ecuadorian politicians create incentives to prioritize
short-term goals, like job creation, over those goals requiring sustained action and having
latent outcomes, like environmental management.
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Second, national economic factors have contributed significant disincentives for
and barriers to the prioritization of environmental management. Given the incentive to
emphasize economic development and the lack of comparable alternative exports, it is
not surprising that every government since the mid-1960s has designed its economic
policies around the petroleum industry. Flores and Merrill note that, “Petroleum was the
single most important element in the Ecuadorian economy, accounting for over 14
percent of the GDP in 1986, two-thirds of all export revenues in that year, and much of
the foreign investment.”13 The dominant position of petroleum within the national
economy has gone unchallenged for four decades and, when placed in context of the
requirements of external debt service, promises to be self-replicating. This factor has
increased in importance over time, as a mushrooming external debt intensified the need to
accumulate capital. As Watts notes: “During the 1980s, the pressure for debt service
coupled with a neoliberal agenda imposed by a series of civilian governments placed
further pressures on opening new oil concessions . . .”14
Governmental decisions to carry out structural economic adjustments as required
by lending terms of multilateral financial institutions have increased the volatility of
domestic politics making it an unattractive political option; nevertheless, the state
continues to bend to the will of its creditors. In short, economic reality has constrained
policy options, encouraged uneven institutional development, and predisposed the
government to act in favor of development projects, particularly within the energy sector
of the economy.
The third significant challenge to the state’s capacity for environmental

13
14

Flores and Merrill, 1.
Watts, 2.
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stewardship is Ecuador’s physical landscape. The country is divided into four verticallyarranged regions that have distinct climates, seasonal variations and cycles, and
temperatures. Mainland pipeline routes necessarily transverse the three continental
regions: the Amazon, the Sierra and the Coast. The geographical and climatic variation
along a single pipeline route is problematic for pipeline siting, construction and
maintenance. For example, the timing of the rainy season varies by region: October-April
for the Sierra; January-April for the Coast; year-round in the Amazon. Nevertheless, all
regions are vulnerable to flooding and mud- and landslides, events that threaten pipeline
integrity. Pipeline design must account for variation within and between the regions.
Oil reserves are primarily located within the Amazon Basin of the Sucumbíos
province in the Oriente, or eastern portion of the country constituting one half of
Ecuador’s total geographic area.15 This region maintains an equatorial climate, meaning
that is notable for its precipitation rates and high temperatures. Ports and refineries are
located along the western coast. The coast is a sub-tropical environment that is vulnerable
to large-scale climatic influences that originate with oceanic currents, like the Peruvian
Current and El Niño.16
The Oriente’s reserves are separated from western coastal ports by the Sierra, or
Andean Cordillera, a north-south mountain range with a peak altitude of 6,267 meters
(20,560 feet) above sea level. In the Andes, climate, river currents, and temperature vary
with altitude. The Andean snow pack gives rise to several major river systems. German
scientist Alexander Von Humboldt coined the term ‘Volcano Alley’ in reference to the
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portion of the Inter-Andean valley that is lined by thirty-three volcanoes.17 Of these, nine
volcanoes are classified as active, and Cotopaxi is recognized as the world’s highest
active volcano. Beginning with a significant eruption in November of 2002, El
Reventador entered a phase of volcanic activity “generally shifting from effusive towards
explosive;” the more active Guagua Pichincha erupted in 1981, 1982, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000, 2002 and 2004.18 Lahar flows (mixtures of ash, rock, lava and water) are common
both in conjunction with and independent of volcanic eruptions, and seismic activity
occurs daily along Ecuador’s thousands of fault lines.19
Because Ecuador is one of the world’s most ‘mega-diverse’ countries, the
environmental stakes are high and there is little room for error. According to the
President of Ecuador's Advisory Commission on Environmental Means: “Ecuador has
twice the plant and animal species of the United States and Canada together, four times
more than all of Europe, and the largest number of plant species per unit of area in the
Americas.”20 Ecuador claims some 1,600 bird species in total; the Mindo Nambillo
Cloudforest Reserve alone houses more than 450 species of birds, of which 46 are close
to extinction.21 EarthTrend’s application of the Protected Area Management Categories,
as developed by The World Conservation Union, reveals that, in 2003, Ecuador had 12%
of its total land area under Categories I and II protection (for scientific, wilderness and
ecosystem protection, and conservation of specific natural features).22 Of the total
national land area, 26% is under some degree of protection.23
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Finally, Ecuador is also distinguished in the diversity of its social landscape.
Although some estimates vary drastically, indigenous people are commonly thought to
number 4.5 million, or about 45 percent of the national population.24 This segment of the
population is further divisible by particular ethnic identity; there are at least twelve
nations, each with its own language, culture and history.25 The vast majority of the
indigenous population lives in the Sierra, or mountainous regions, and was integrated
with the national culture and economy through feudalistic land tenure arrangements that
prevailed until the 1964 Agrarian Land Reform. While this reform was sweeping, it
lacked the institutional backing to be effectively implemented. An immediate result was
that the Sierra indigenous population that lacked the resources needed to acquire land in
the highlands.
A second and related legacy of the agrarian reform was the rush of dislocated
migrants from the Sierra to the Amazonian region. The government facilitated this
relocation by declaring agriculturally unproductive land abandoned, and granting land
titles to any person who made Aproductive use of at least 80% of a holding.”26 Many
large landowners, fearing expropriation of their lands under the 1964 reform, sold off
large amounts of (poor quality) land and headed to the Oriente, where the government’s
incentive package for colonizers included funding and protection for new landowners.
For example, one report mentions that, “. . . colonists normally received a forty- to fiftyhectare parcel in contrast to the minifundio typically awarded former sharecroppers or
huasipungueros.”27
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Barraclough and Eguren note that the Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform and
Colonization Institute (IERAC) “assigned over 2.5 million hectares of “vacant” state
lands, mostly in the Amazonian forest region, to some 60,000 colonists” in the two
decades following the reform.28 An estimated 250,000 to 300,000 colonizers lived in the
Oriente by 1997.29 This planned colonization of the Oriente misappropriated lands
traditionally occupied by a variety of uncontacted ethnic groups. The state’s promotion of
colonization of the Oriente continued ever after it ratified the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 which states that “The rights of ownership and
possession of [indigenous peoples] over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall
be recognised.”30
Amazonian indigenous nations that historically had enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy from the national government and economy organized against the invasion of
industry and colonizers. The Federation of Shuar Centers was founded as a local activist
group in the Amazon Basin in 1964, while highlanders established a regional indigenous
organization, ECUARUNARI, in 1972. As oil extraction activities spread, CONFENAIE
was established in 1980 as a regional body representing the interests of 500,000
indigenous Amazonians (Wilkenfeld). Each of these groups demanded that the
government redistribute appropriated land according to historical and cultural basis of
ownership. As Kimerling notes, “Legalization and demarcation of indigenous territories
has long been the frontline of defence used by indigenous organizations to protect
indigenous peoples from the oil boom.”31 Thus, in a single decade and in the absence of
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any precedent, the opening of the Oriente sparked a movement in support of ethnicallybased land rights and the creation of two strong regional organizations.
The land issue gained salience during the OCP era as the increasing strength of
the indigenous movement forced the government to confront the issue. In 1981, the state
passed La Ley Forestal y de Conservación de Áreas Naturales y Vida Silvestre [Law of
Forestry and Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife]. This legislation focused
exclusively on the Oriente, claiming subsurface soil rights for the state. In 1986, the
regional organizations ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE united to form CONAIE. This
organization’s first national demonstrations were organized in protest to governmental
land reform proposals in 1990 and again in 1994.32 Indeed, CONAIE that has consistently
made “integral agrarian reform one its key demands” is made clear by the inclusion of
land titling at the top of its list of demands during the 1990 uprising and by the
government’s descision to respond to the 1990 strike by dispatching IERAC officials to
negotiate with the leadership of CONAIE.33 However, while these uprisings did force
proposal modifications resulting in increased protection for communal territory integrity
and in the transfer of legal title to three million acres of traditional lands to the
Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP), they did little to systematically
improve the status of indigenous land rights.34 The 1995 establishment of CONAIE’s
political arm, Pachakutik, resulted in the reintroduction of the land issue onto the national
political agenda while the on-going legal and physical oil-related conflicts in the Oriente
have earned Ecuadorian land issues a place on the international agenda.
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CASE: SOTE ERA, 1964 – 1990

Actors and Institutional Capacity.
In 1964, Texpet, a subsidiary of Texaco-Petroleum Company, concluded the first
successful oil exploration in Ecuador’s Amazon rainforest. The following year, a Joint
Operating Agreement known as the ‘Napo Agreement’ established Texaco’s sole
responsibility for the construction and operation of all facilities and infrastructure
necessary for oil exploitation and transportation until 1990, at which time the state would
have the option of assuming control of the consortium. In 1969, the government and the
Texpet Consortium agreed to construct the SOTE. The pipeline’s 480-km route
originated in concession areas in the north-eastern Amazon and terminated at
Esmeralda’s oil refinery and ports on the western coast. It was the world’s highest
pipeline, peaking at 4,064 meters above sea level as it crosses the Andes.35 The SOTE
was initially designed to carry as many as 250,000 barrels per day of high-value light
crude.36
The military government of General Lara implemented the country’s first
petroleum law after SOTE construction commenced. La Ley de Hidrocarburos de 1971
[Hydrocarbon Law of 1971] required that oil companies take those measures necessary
for the protection of the “flora and fauna,” and prohibited the burning of natural gas
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without governmental permission.37 Article 29 of the law established that: “Contractors
are obligated to: (e) employ modern and efficient machinery; (s) adopt necessary methods
to protect plants, animals, and other natural resources ; (t) avoid contamination of waters,
air and lands.”38 These obligations were reiterated, but not further specified, in the
Hydrocarbon Laws of 1974 and 1978 and the Hydrocarbon Law Reform of 1982.
In 1972, the Texpet consortium completed the construction of the SOTE. During
the same year, the state negotiated the Contrato para exploración y explotación de
hidrocarburos entre Texaco Petroleum Company y Ecuadorian Gulf Oil Company
[Contract between the Texaco Petroleum Company and the Ecuadorian Gulf Company
for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons]. Powers and Quarles find that, “the
language in the contract reflects the prohibitions included in the [1971 Hydrocarbon]
law.”39 Finally, in 1973, Gustavo Jarrín Ampudia, Minister of Natural Resources, entered
Ecuador into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
renegotiated governmental contracts with private foreign oil companies, extending them
until June of 1992.
Thus, the SOTE was conceived of and partially constructed before the creation of
legal and institutional mechanisms providing for governmental control of the
hydrocarbon industry, and it was completed before Ecuador committed to any
international production standards. Furthermore, state policies, where they existed,
centralized legislative and regulatory functions under the executive. General Lara
facilitated this concentration of power by creating a national oil company, the
Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana [Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation, or
37
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CEPE], in 1972. The CEPE gained a 62% majority interest ownership of the Consortium
in 1976, and in 1986 the company became the sole owner of the Transecuadorian pipeline
in 1986.
The state preference for centralization of legislative and oversight functions was
also evident in the design of a new agency, the Dirección General de Medio Ambiente
[General Directorate of the Environment, or DIGEMA]. This executive-branch agency
was established in1984 under the auspices and control of the Ministerio de Energía y
Minas [Ministry of Energy and Mines, or MEM]. The inherent conflict of interest and the
potential for the subordination of DIGEMA’s environmental mission are clear when one
considers the MEM’s primary mission: to promote and facilitate extractive industry.

Social and Environmental Impact.
Spills caused by breaks in the pipelines have resulted in extensive environmental
damage in Ecuador. Physical compromise of the SOTE has resulted primarily from poor
planning for and response to natural disasters, and from substandard or nonextant
maintenance.
The potential for environmental disaster caused by the state decision to route the
SOTE through areas known for volcanic and seismic volatility was not accounted for
through pipeline design or emergency contingency planning. Two 1987 earthquakes
(magnitudes 6.1 and 6.9) occurred “along the SOTE alignment” in the area of volcanic
activity known as Quito/Reventador.40 Slope and river dam failures and massive
landslides destroyed seventy kilometers of the SOTE, resulting in plummeting production
40
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rates and a five-month repair and cleanup effort. As there were no disaster response plans
in place, the cleanup effort was coordinated and financed by the World Bank through its
Emergency Petroleum Reconstruction Project.41 This was “the most extensive naturally
induced pipeline outage ever experienced in the world.”42 The duration of the outage
reflects the lack of contingency planning and the necessarily improvised nature of
remediation efforts.
One year later, the SOTE ruptured during a landslide near Esmeraldas, the
destination port. Unfarallon reports that, “Oil flowed down the streets of the town and
into the river. Around 10 pm, a spark ignited the oil. Twelve people died from the
flames, six more were never found.”43 A SOTE rupture in August 1992 spilled
275,000-gallons, “caused the Rio Napo to run black for days, and forced downstream
Peru and Brazil to declare national states of emergency for the affected regions.”44
Unfarallan reports that in the first two decades of operation, the SOTE sustained
“more than 60 major ruptures resulting in 614,000 barrels of spilled oil B more than twice
the 260,000 barrels that were spilled by the Exxon Valdez.”45 Knudson notes that, “By
contrast, the 800-mile trans-Alaskan pipeline, which came on line in 1977 and carries
more than twice as much oil, has spilled just 85,000 barrels.”46 The Organization of
American States added that Aruptures of secondary pipelines have resulted in substantial
additional discharge into the environment. An additional 1,000 to 2,000 gallons of oil
reportedly spill from the flowlines connecting the wells to the stations every two
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weeks.”47
State siting decisions also left the SOTE vulnerable to guerillas that operate in the
Oriente. Human activity has frequently undermined the physical integrity of the SOTE,
resulting in oil spillage. In acts of sabotage and anti-oil protest, the SOTE has been
attacked and bombed. The steady increase in militarization along the pipeline route is
evident. The government responded to oil-related strikes and protests in the Sucumbios,
Napo and Orellana provinces by declaring numerous states of emergency, some lasting as
long as two months.48 Rene Bucaram, former director of Texaco’s Ecuador operations,
accused the state-run CEPE of capitalizing on the instances of human sabotage to divert
attention from the true causes of SOTE spills. After the 2001 “River Toachi” spill, he told
Reuters: “They aren't going to keep tricking us that this was caused by a bomb. This is
poor management of the pipeline, and it's time the government provides an
explanation.”49
Increasingly, paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Ecuador (FARE) have claimed responsibility for attacks. The FARE is modeled on and
articulated with Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and its
presence in Ecuador underscores fears that the spillover of Colombia’s civil war into the
northeastern provinces of Ecuador translates into intensifying security threats to
Ecuador’s pipelines. Amazon Watch notes that, “In the past 12 years, Colombia’s Caño
Limon oil pipeline has been attacked more than 700 times by guerrilla groups, spilling
more than two million barrels of crude oil. Five attacks on Ecuador’s SOTE have already
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left several people dead.”50 Thus, while the siting of the pipeline in the northeastern
provinces of Ecuador increased the possibility of significant, negative environmental
impact resulting from local insurgency, state policy has been strictly retroactive.
Most of what is known about the impact of oil operations in the Amazon during
the first two decades has been collected, analyzed and distributed by individuals working
through extra-governmental forums. Judith Kimerling’s study of the environmental and
social impacts of oil activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon was the first critical
documentation and assessment ever made public; it appeared in English in 1991 and then
in Spanish in 1993. This pioneering work “elevated oil contamination in Ecuador to the
status of an international environmental problem. It was the first time that clear evidence
was presented to the media, the government, and the oil companies, that supported the
claims of the communities.”51 Amazon Crude garnered high-level attention within the
NGO community, which reacted quickly by publicizing the information gathered by
Kimerling. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) led the pack by publishing
the 1991 English version. Robert F Kennedy, Jr., then staff counsel for the NRDC, wrote
a preface that promised plenty of facts:
Discharges from secondary pipelines have never been estimated or recorded;
however, the smaller flowlines discharge approximately 10,000 gallons per week
of petroleum into the Amazon, and each day production pits dump an astounding
4.3 million gallons of toxic production wastes and treatment chemicals into
Amazonia's rivers, streams and groundwater.52
In addition to quantifying the direct environmental damage, Kimerling’s narrative
contributed to an understanding of the cumulative impacts of the oil industry in Ecuador
by describing the process from cradle-to-grave. For example, she noted that petroleum
50

AmazonWatch, Eostar 2002, 1.
San Sebastián and Córdoba, 7.
52
Robert Kennedy Jr., Preface.
51

31

companies constructed many roads into the Amazon in order to facilitate access to the
concession areas and import construction equipment to build exploitation facilities. This
caused mass deforestation, threatened endangered species, and disrupted ecosystems.
Kimerling also documented the leeching and dumping of toxic byproducts, and traced the
effects of these practices on the health of the Oriente’s indigenous inhabitants. Kimerling
made clear that these peoples depended on the freshwater Amazonian river system for
bathing, cooking, and drinking and food cultivation purposes and looked to the rainforest
in general for medicine, education, sustenance, shelter, cultural customs and spiritual
identities.
A second wave of environmental impact assessment was generated in the course
of on-going, class-action civil suits against Texaco and other petroleum companies.
Aguinda v Texaco, brought on behalf of indigenous Amazonian inhabitants against
Texaco, was filed by an Ecuadorian expatriate lawyer in the New York court system in
1993 under the provision of the US Alien Claims Tort Act. The fact-finding missions
mandated by this and by subsequent trials have reduced scientific uncertainty about the
environmental effects of certain industry procedures. They have also affirmed the links
between environmental degradation and pollution and the destruction of the habitats,
culture, livelihoods and physical wellbeing of the Amazonian indigenous population.
Fact-finding in Aguinda v Texaco has primarily focused on Texaco’s operations
policies in three areas of activity: exploration, exploitation, and infrastructure.
Exploration phases rely on seismic testing, remote sensing and satellite imagery and
mapping to detect the presence of oil reserves. This process requires that land is cleared
to allow for the positioning of seismic testing devices. If the analysis looks promising,
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access roads to test well sites are constructed. The road construction is extensive and
extremely invasive; as O’Rourke and Connolly explain, “mobile rigs for temporary
drilling can weigh over 2 million pounds” and the effort to gain access means that
substantially “clearing land for roads and platforms can lead to deforestation and
erosion.”53
The second activity area, exploitation, is a two-part process. First, the extraction
of crude from the ground relies on heavy machinery for the construction and operation of
pumping stations. Then, the separation of the crude’s constituent elements requires the
use of toxic chemicals, including benzene, toluene, xylene, mercury, and lead. In its 20year operation in Ecuador, Texaco routinely dumped the formation waters (totaling
464,766,540 barrels) into open and unlined pits and nearby tributaries, and burned (or
“flared”) an estimated 235 billion cubic feet of natural gas byproduct.54 Aguinda v Texaco
charges that Texaco’s production pits released “4.3 million gallons of toxic waste and
treated chemical” into the environment.55
The third area of activity scrutinized by Aguinda v Texaco is infrastructure
construction. This broad category of activity includes the construction of access
roadways; extraction, pumping, heating and transfer stations; central and secondary
pipelines; 340 wells and 1000 pits; hard-waste dumps; helicopter landing strips; worker
housing; and company towns. Infrastructure was often poorly designed and maintained.
For example, Texaco spread crude waste on roadways, purportedly to decrease the
amount of air-borne dust resulting from deforestation and construction of access roads.56
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Conventional wisdom holds that access roads, such as those constructed by the oil
companies, open areas to “colonizers, land speculators and loggers . . .”57
Comparative research by Powers and Quarles indicates that: “Chevron’s decision
to discharge saline produced water to surface waters in Ecuador was made at a time when
these same discharges would have not have been allowed in U.S. oilfields in similar
situations exactly because it was known that such discharges would have severely
harmful impacts on the environment and human health.”58 Thus, Power and Quarles find
that, in its decision relating to discharge of production water, its design of waste pits, and
its use of production water flaring, Texaco violated industry and international standards
based on an scientific consensus regarding the environmental impacts of such practices.
Texaco states that it has “always worked with the technology that was consistent
with generally accepted international standards at the time it operated the fields in
Ecuador. The technology used by Texaco Petroleum Company was common in several
other tropical or semi-tropical countries such as Angola, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia,
Mexico, and Nigeria.”59 However, Aguinda v Texaco challenges such assertions by
stating that, although Texaco had “obtained in 1971 and in 1974 patents in the U.S. on
technological improvements for the reinjection of formation waters,” it chose to employ
outdated and discredited methods for handling formation waters in Ecuador.60 Thus, it is
obvious that Texaco’s decision to not employ then-modern technology in its operation in
Ecuador was taken on a political, rather than a technological, basis. The lack of
specification of contractor obligations in Ecuador’s legislative mechanisms, and non-
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extant regulation and enforcement of standards allowed the industry to prioritize the
economic over the environmental bottom-line.
Environmental damages have also been evaluated through proxy measures. For
example, negative impacts of substandard operating procedures on public environmental
services have been linked to public health threats. Epidemiologist Miguel San Sebastian
established that proximity and exposure to oil wells, contaminated groundwater and
dumping sites causes significant increase in the incidence of miscarriage, cancer, skin
infection and respiratory illness. San Sebastian and Córdoba also demonstrated that the
concentration of incidences in the Oriente has resulted from degraded environmental
services rather than a natural predisposition of local indigenous persons.61
San Sebastian’s findings indicate that the costs of the oil industry activity are not
evenly distributed, but rather are borne primarily by the inhabitants of the Oriente
including colonizers and indigenous people. While both of these groups have objected to
their poor treatment by the government and industry, indigenous protesters have enjoyed
a notably greater amount of publicity and support for their claims. Their ethnicity-based
proprietary claims to ancestral lands and to inherited cultural practices, including those
linked to life in the rainforest, resonated with environmental organizations working in
Ecuador. The latter recognized that an alliance with the former could put a human face on
the campaign, or to frame it in terms of the violation of the basic human rights of the
affected indigenous populations. In doing so, the international activists protesting
Ecuador’s oil activities joined with the domestic indigenous-rights activists, facilitating
an emerging network and shaping its character, content and organizational qualities.
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Analysis.
This case establishes a bottom line for comparison; it is a portrait of the social and
environmental outcomes of unconstrained state decision-making. The SOTE era can also
be said to contain the seeds of subsequent activism by providing a value-based
motivation and a principal strategy for organized resistance. The network emphasized its
opposition to the state’s view of nature (specifically, the Amazon rainforest) as a space to
be colonized, developed and subordinated to the national purpose. It also established that
indigenous and environmental activists shared compatible values and goals.
Activism gained momentum as information about the SOTE’s social and
ecological impact was gathered and disseminated. For example, San Sebastian and
Córdoba explain that
In 1994 the Amazon Defense Front (Frente de Defensa de la Amazonía [FDA])
was created with the participation of numerous organizations of farmers and
Indians and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the objective of
supervising the trial against Texaco. Since its formation, the group has organized
various workshops about the environment, published accusations and reports
about oil spills, led community information sessions and organized the visits of
government representatives to the contaminated areas, in an attempt to open the
eyes of the authorities to this disaster.62
In its earliest stages, the campaign consistently leveraged information to galvanize
public support. Interestingly, the state often relied on the information supplied by
activists since it lacked the institutional and technological capacities and expertise to
make independent assessments. Certainly, the state was not able to counter the activists’
claims and largely left this fight to the oil industry. The retraction of the state and
concomitant dominance of industry in the fight over information seems to have
62
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contributed to “venue shopping,” as in the filing of Aguinda v Texaco in the US court
system.
Also important was information, such as that provided by San Sebastian, which
pointed to a link between environmental and social damages. This connection facilitated
a tentative alliance between environmental and indigenous activists, with the latter group
drawing additional support from the international human rights movement. While
symbiotic views on nature explain the normative basis for the interaction of these groups,
the glue for their emerging alliance seems to have been tactical and pragmatic in nature.
Engaging in what Keck and Sikkink refer to as “issue framing,” the alliance presented the
environmentalists the opportunity to personalize the environmental problems by
transferring the campaign focus from tree and plant species to innocent human victims.
Symbolic strategies also supported this crucial step towards designing a campaign
capable of attracting large and sympathetic audiences. It facilitated the network’s goal of
casting the problem in dichotomous (right or wrong) terms and establishing “short causal
links.”63
Establishing that the object or action under protest was the creation, and remains
the responsibility, of the targeted actor involves vilification of the target. The Ecuadorian
case shows that, in the process of, establishing blame and responsibility, a network might
too quickly dismiss the state’s defense of its actions. Yet this is a factor to be accounted
for in theoretical terms, at the least, since it may constitute a sufficient counter-argument
and thereby impact campaigners’ ability to monopolize value-based positions and to
mobilize support.
The Ecuadorian state’s support of the oil industry can not be readily dispensed
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with in this analysis. That the government has steadfastly supported and promoted the oil
industry is not surprising given that oil revenues account for a lion’s share of the GDP. In
defense of its promotion of extractive industry, the government has emphasized the
importance of oil revenues to national economic well-being, and coupled this fact with a
reminder that some 70% of the total national population lives under the poverty line. As
Lucas reports, “Ecuadorian President Gustavo Noboa has repeatedly accused the
conservationists of obstructing a project that is essential to reviving the troubled economy
of this Andean nation of 12.4 million, which depends on oil for over one-third of export
revenues.”64 Essentially, the state has argued that it is obligated to guard against any
forces that would undermine national well-being, uniquely situated to do so. This implies
that the state faces a choice between providing for the benefit of the whole versus the
benefit of the few, and that it must choose according to its moral obligation to the
majority.
This contention is difficult to counter for those who would hold the government to
international normative standards since exactly such a ‘collective good’ argument is
enshrined as a fundamental principle in international law. However, the network could
have seized the opportunity to question the state’s attempt to define the national interest
in economic terms. For example, the campaign could have asked how the state’s
corporatist mentality would serve other collective goods such as participatory democracy,
civil liberties, or improved public services.
It would seem from Arsel’s account of nuclear energy activism in Turkey that this
particular counter-defense, one that claims that the state’s policies are moral and in the
public interest, will serve any number of governments quite well. This remains a
64
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profound problem, one yet to be clarified by the literature: how does, or should, a TAN
prioritize the rights of the few over the rights of the many? Or, how does a TAN prioritize
some collective goods over others, and can it expect to win popular support if it
emphasizes clean air at the expense of employment and income opportunities? Realworld situations are not often simple, yet a TAN must, according to Keck and Sikkink,
present to its public a right/wrong interpretation and a unified network position in order
to create an effective frame. This is a major theoretical complication yet to be addressed
by the proponents of the TAN perspective.
Finally, this case both confirms and challenges a number of theoretical
assumptions about the political characteristics of the state. For example, it underscores
that neither democracy nor formal provision of citizen rights guarantees that a state will
be responsive to internal pressure. This is to be expected under Keck and Sikkink’s
formulation which holds that some degree of blockage of domestic political channels
drives domestic actors to reach out to vertical and horizontal allies. The quality of
democracy present within any given state can therefore be expected to affect the number
and type of venues available to citizens who seek redress of grievances; this in turn is
directly related to the need for a domestic activist or victim to seek international allies in
order to exercise influence on the domestic government. However, one may object that
simply describing a channel as ‘blocked’ is insufficient; degree of inaccessibility to, or
repression by, the state would seem to matter for understanding both the motivation and
the ability to actively organize. A similar line of argument is explored in the collective
action literature by Mara Loveman who holds that, contrary to popular wisdom,
“comparative analysis of the emergence of human rights organizations under military
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dictatorships in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina” have shown that severe repression might
catalyze collective action.65
The Ecuadorian case also makes clear that active membership in the international
community of democracies does not always motivate a target to honor its international
commitments or to react to an international “shame game.” In fact, despite mounting
pressure from within and without, the Ecuadorian state quickened the pace of
development of the Amazon, auctioning concession areas in violation of ILO No 169,
and openly resorted to the application of force in order to repress network opposition.
International condemnation grew as the government repeatedly took extreme and
illegal action in defense of the extractive industry. For example, its military signed
contracts with private oil companies ensuring protection of personnel, equipment and
production activities in exchange for meals and medical care.66 Indigenous inhabitants
protested this militarization of their traditional and titled lands, but to no avail. Therefore,
the contractual military-industrial relationship violated Article 28 of the United Nations
Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Groups, which states that “Military
activities shall not take place in the lands and territories of indigenous peoples, unless
otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned.”67
Amnesty International reported numerous instances in which indigenous peoples
have suffered bodily harm, kidnappings, torture and death as a result of military action on
their lands.68 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights reprimanded the government
for its role in these developments, and charged it to take corrective action immediately.
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However, Amnesty International reported that Ecuador’s Minister of Mines and Energy
responded to the injunction by saying “la OEA no manda aquí” [or, “the OAS does not
give the orders here”] and affirming that the state’s policies would remain unchanged.69
Attempts to “shame” the state were not effective leverage tools. Ongoing
monitoring and reporting by the international normative community did not result in hard
consequences for the Ecuadorian government’s repeated violation of its commitments to
international human rights norms. International obligations did not cause the state to be
responsive to external criticism of its human rights or environmental policies and
practices. The state cannot be said to have shown any appreciable degree of vulnerability
to international shaming, or what Keck and Sikkink refer to as “moral leverage.”70
How then should activists assess the potential for moral leverage over the target?
How, for example, can one judge the degree to which a state is likely to value, or
otherwise be sensitive to, international opinion? What should be made of the fact that the
majority of states targeted by TANs at any given moment do, in fact, maintain an array of
economic and diplomatic relations with other international actors? Clearly, some
differentiation between types of commitments, coupled with a contextual understanding
of a targeted state’s international and domestic position, is required.
Furthermore, the international system is not a static entity and changes abroad
may alter the availability of leverage; this could be problematic for sustained campaigns.
Pieck finds that this was a complicating factor in the case of Ecuador, since “the
landscape of opportunities that many indigenous leaders and environmental NGOs
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encountered in the late 1980s and early 1990s had changed by 2005.”71 How can activists
predict, much less control, the moment at which international conditions might
complement domestic events to increase state sensitivity and thereby yield the desired
campaign outcome? Sikkink herself acknowledges the difficulty inherent in this exercise
which requires that activists visualize simultaneous political opportunities at both the
domestic and international levels. She warns against the temptation to focus on the
opportunity structure at one level while holding the other level constant, and should
instead view their environment as “a two-level interacting political opportunity
structure.”72
This point is further illustrated by Sydney Tarrow, whose The New Transnational
Activism describes the events that led to Pinochet’s 2004 indictment for human rights
crimes. Chilean exiles collaborated with British and Spanish authorities, rather than the
reluctant Chilean state, to arrange for Pinochet’s first interrogation in Spanish courts. The
2004 ruling against Pinochet eventually encouraged the Chilean state to reverse policy
and pursue the prosecution of a number of junta leaders, producing what Tarrow refers to
as a domestic “justice cascade.”73 However, the author contends that this outcome
resulted from the serendipitous, rather than strategic, combination of a number of
delicate, time-sensitive and complex international and domestic events. As emphasized
by Tarrow: “international opportunities seldom come together as fortuitously as they did
in the Pinochet case.”74
What is clear with regards to this matter is that greater specification of terms and
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conditions is needed. As the Ecuadorian case suggests, it is unwise to anticipate state
decision-making based on, for example, the classification of a target state as “democratic
or not.” Static conceptions, presented without referents, are not theoretically meaningful
to the scholar or practically useful to the activist. It is a generally accepted notion that the
term “democratic” can refer to any number of policy constellations, as the political
science literature concerned with subtypes and adjectivization of democracy well
illustrates. Furthermore, a democratic state, however specified, should not be expected to
function as a uniformly democratic entity. Rather, all states display gradations of
democratic tendencies that vary according to any number of factors, including: the nature
of the relevant issue area, events in international or national politics and relations, the
need for favorable access to the international market, etc. Promising work on this concept
has recently emerged from both the activist and the scholarly communities. For example,
Transparency International, an organization that pursues an anti-corruption agenda,
publishes a Bribe Payers Index (BPI) that ranks the frequency of incidences of corruption
by both country and industry, a tool of great practical value to activists who seek to
predict the receptivity of a target state on a given issue. Terry Karl finds that overreliance on petroleum exportation causes petro-states to follow a specific institutional and
political trajectory, regardless of their domestic mode of governance or international
commitments. Generally, these and similar efforts support the notion that greater
specification of terms and concepts would be beneficial to scholars and activists alike.
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CASE ANALYSIS: OCP, 1989 – 2003

Actors and Institutional Capacity.
In 1989, CEPE was reorganized as Petroecuador, and became sole operator of
SOTE. Informal negotiations for the OCP began during the same year. The original OCP
Consortium was comprised of Alberta Energy, Kerr McGee, Occidental Petroleum,
AGIP, Perez Companc, Repsol-YPF and Techint.75
In 1992, Ecuador withdrew from OPEC, in preparation for the augmentation of its
production capacity. Although a series of expansions had increased the carrying capacity
of the SOTE to some 390,000 barrels per day, transport capacity reportedly fell short of
production potentials; the new pipeline promised a capacity of 450,000 barrels per day,
more than doubling Ecuador’s output.76
The OCP project was associated with a trend towards external and institutional
involvement in the effort to assess the project’s potential impacts; this was a departure
from the agential nature of discovery and information dissemination of the SOTE era.
One reason for this shift was the difference in project scope, and thereby in potential
impact. Also important was the increasingly salient issue of liability for negative
environmental impact.
Until the mid 1990s, the state consistently dealt with negative environmental
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impact through informal and case-specific arrangements. In the few instances in which
the state imposed environmental standards on the hydrocarbon industry, it did so through
arrangements with individual companies rather than through wholesale adjustments of its
legislation or the strengthening of its institutional enforcement capability. For example,
the 1993 filing of Aguinda v Texaco prompted Texaco and the state to reach an
agreement for the remediation of Texpet’s negative environmental impact. Announced in
1995, the settlement cost Texaco a mere $40 million, obligated the company to cleanup
only 156 of its 627 unlined toxic waste pits, and provided the company a pretext for the
renewal of its motion to dismiss Aguinda v Texaco.77 The government certified Texpet’s
remediation in 1998 and thereby released the company from future liability. However, the
state neglected to subsequently update its environmental standards through legislative or
regulatory means, allowing instead for the continuation of those same laws that had
permitted Texpet’s disastrous environmental practices.
A final reason for the institutional character of the OCP debate was the growing
influence of non-governmental organizations. Beginning in the 1980s, non-domestic
organizations representing social, political and scientific concerns established a presence
in Ecuador. In the 1990s, indigenous rights and environmental organizations formed
transnational alliances, resulting in expanded access to non-state intellectual and financial
resources, and providing support for the creation and development of domestic
counterparts. The domestic indigenous and environmental groups relied heavily on the
technical, scientific, legal, and financial support of their international and regional
counterparts.
While the majority of the international organizations engaged in sustained action
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over time, the occasional star has also appeared; in 2002, Julia Butterfly Hill joined
activists in the Mindo Cloudforest for Ecuador’s maiden tree-sit in protest against the
government’s approval for the routing of the OCP through the protected Mindo area.
Such incidents aided in broadcasting the debate to the international arena. The interest
generated abroad was particularly important to environmental policy evaluation since it
expanded the epistemic community, or regime united in cohesive discourse, to include
respected scientists whose research contributions reduced scientific uncertainty regarding
the environmental effects of hydrocarbon activity. Significantly, this community
produced the most thorough, and sometimes the only, EIAs of pipeline designs, siting
decisions, and emergency response and mitigation policies.
One example is the contribution of The Mindo Working Group (MWG) to the
debate over the siting of the pipeline. The OCP was largely designed to parallel the route
of the SOTE, thereby containing invasive construction and maximizing knowledge about
the potential problems of the OCP route. However, the state aggressively promoted a
northern diversion of the OCP for a 100-mile stretch near Quito that would slice through
the famously pristine and ecologically diverse Mindo National Cloudforest. The MWG
found that the EIA for this “northern route” did not account for potential cumulative
impacts, including:78
- Encroaching cultivation
- Encroaching pastures
- Wood extraction for lumber and firewood
- Species (e.g., frogs) extinction in the Mindo region
- Increased forest fragmentation
- Noise related to pipeline construction
- Environmental degradation of the Mindo IBA
- Degradation of the water quality of the hydrographic basins
- Reduction in economic benefits
78
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In a second example, additional concern over the Mindo route was voiced in a
December 2001 letter from high-level World Bank officials that insisted the OCP
consortium retract its unsubstantiated claim that the pipeline project was in compliance
with World Bank standards. The letter was followed by perhaps the best example of
influential, non-domestic evaluations of the OCP project: the 2002 report of the findings
of Robert Goodland’s Environmental and Social Impact Evaluations (EIA and SIA, or
Social Impact Evaluation) of the OCP project.
Goodland, chief of the Environment Department of the World Bank for 25 years
until his retirement in 2001, visited Ecuador in 2002 to complete the study that was
“initiated by the German NGOs "Rettet den Regenwald" and "Urgewald” and supported
by Greenpeace, the Institute Suedwind as well as several US and Italian NGOs and the
three biggest Italian labor unions.”79 In his report, Goodland accused the OCP consortium
of substantial non-compliance with World Bank environmental and social criteria,
namely Natural Habitats, Involuntary Resettlement, Environmental Assessment, and
Indigenous Peoples. Goodland further confirmed that the alternative pipeline route
promoted by activists was environmentally superior to the route (through the Mindo
Cloudforest and the GEF’s Choco-Andean Corridor) already approved by the state.80
Neither the World Bank nor Goodland was able to convince the state to
reconsider the Mindo route. However, Goodland’s condemnation of the pipeline project
did cause Germany’s largest publicly-owned bank, Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB),
to withdraw as the lead arranger of the original 17-year, $900 million OCP syndicated
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bank loan.81 Following the release of the Goodland report, network activists in Germany
charged public officials, including the Prime Minister, from the German federal state of
Nordhein-Westfalen (the bank’s principal shareholder) with complicity.82 In
Parliamentary hearings on the subject, Germany’s influential Green Party joined with
NGOs in insisting that the WestLB honor the terms of its lending policy which required
project compliance with World Bank environmental guidelines.83 Although the pipeline
was by then largely completed, the WestLB withdrew completely.
In contrast to the trends towards specialization and diversification of knowledge
through increasing foreign and substate institutional involvement, the state continued to
centralize decision-making and to undermine environmental initiatives. The short-lived
independence of DIGEMA followed this trend. In 1988, this agency began a campaign to
strengthen hydrocarbon industry regulation. During this period, Conoco submitted
Ecuador’s first (if incomplete) EIA to DIGEMA.84 Article 31 of the 1990 Ley de
Hidrocarburos [Hydrocarbon Law] reasserted that private and state-owned oil companies
must submit detailed EIAs addressing all phases of operation. Yet, even as its
responsibilities were reiterated, the DIGEMA was gutted and its responsibilities and
resources were transferred to the Dirección Nacional del Medio Ambiente [National
Directorate of the Environment, or DINAMA]. Both of these agencies were controlled by
the new Subsecretaria de Medio Ambiente [Subsecretary of the Environment, or SMA],
which was itself under the auspices of the MEM. Kimerling reports on the structural
implication of the reorganization, stating that: the 1990 annual budget for the SMA was
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$10,000; its four personnel were responsible for all of the extractive activities throughout
the country; and none of the four was hired as a field-based compliance inspector.85
Not surprisingly, DINAMA’s mandate to protect the environment was
subordinated to the MEM’s mandate to promote extractive industry activity. In 1990, the
MEM developed a “gentleman’s agreement” between the industry and the government,
effectively bypassing the DINAMA. The Acta de compromiso para observer las
disposiciones de manejo ambiental para las actividades hidrocarburíferas [Compromise
Agreement for observing the environmental management rules for hydrocarbon
activities] stated that industry compliance with environmental standards would be
undertaken on a voluntary basis through 1992, at which time the issues of monitoring and
enforcement would be revisited.86
Velasco succinctly describes the centralization of the bureaucratic structure as it
was until 1995. He explains that the MEM’s SMA handled all development and
regulation of sub-surface resources. The SMA had at its disposal three MEM agencies,
which retained the following mandates: DINAMI (National Directorate of Mining)
granted concession, exploitation and exploration permits; DINAMA (National
Directorate of Environment) was primarily concerned with the environmental dimensions
of resource development, received EIAs and was responsible for all monitoring,
enforcement, etc.; and CODIGEM (Corporation for Geological-Mining-Metallurgical
Research and Development) provided technical assistance to miners, and supported
research and development.87
In 1995, a $14 million World Bank loan to Ecuador’s established the Mining
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Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project. The Project
Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of 2003 found that institutional capacity was
greatly undermined as a result of the bureaucratic structure, as described by Velasco. The
World Bank noted that the centralization of decision-making and the existence of internal
conflicting mandates were particularly troublesome. The PPAR concluded that:
When most environmental responsibilities are delegated to a sector ministry, as in
Ecuador, it is important to reduce potential internal conflicts of interest between
the sector ministry’s roles as investment promoter and environmental control and
enforcement agency, by clearly separating the responsibility for these functions.
Furthermore, sector oversight capacity also needs to be built up within the
Ministry of the Environment, and support of local communities needs to be
secured.88

A 1996 executive decree created the Ministerio de Medio Ambiente [Ministry of
the Environment, or MMA]. In 1997, the MMA began to act on its mandate: “gestor,
asesor, promotor, concertador y ejecutor de las políticas ambientales” [facilitator,
assessor, promoter, coordinator and executor of environmental issues].89 In 1997, the
state’s Agenda 21 report cast the creation of this multi-purpose agency as a move towards
“integrated decision-making.”90 In the same report, the state noted that its MEM funding
had benefited from increased support from USAID and UNDP, but declined to declare its
actual budget.

Social and Environmental Impacts.
Data for the amounts of crude spilled from the OCP are unavailable. However,
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Weemaels provides information about spillage impacts on local residents that can be
treated as a proxy measure of spillage; although they are not quantitative, her findings
demonstrate that spillage events have been consistent and widespread. Weemaels reports
that Acción Ecológica’s independent EIA of pipeline impacts through March 2002
contains data collected through interviews with the thousands of people living in the
direct path of the OCP. These data indicate that, of the total number interviewed, 89%
lost crops and 15% lost farm animals as a result of oil spillage from leeches or ruptures in
the OCP. An additional 19% reported the loss of infrastructure, such as fencing,
roadways or pasture, as a result of the siting and a destructive construction process.91
Furthermore, soil erosion resulting from the deforestation of the OCP route and access
roads caused severe flooding. Weemaels estimates the total damage suffered by
interview respondents at $1,299,390.92
Weemaels also notes those environmental impact costs that are not easily
quantified in economic terms. For example, the EIA recorded contamination of drinking
water in 157 water reserves, streams and wells. Weemaels claims that each instance of
contamination was the result of “inadequate technology, negligence of the workers and
lack of available funds for mitigation of the impacts.”93 Weemaels also includes data on
the loss of flora and fauna and of various animal species. Finally, Weemaels writes of
“extensive evidence that a pre-determined plan was lacking, and that instead, decisions
were being made along the way.”94 In support of this observation, she cites large
campsites within protected areas, two roads not included in the EIA originally submitted
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by Technit, and evidence of advanced construction directly over a fault line.
This last observation points to the need to make unapproved and unsupervised
adjustments in response to unexpected physical realities. This is a reality of the
construction process that is not accounted for in EIAs or other forms of preliminary
planning, despite the fact that many design and construction companies acknowledge this
as a legitimate and routine occurrence. For example, Hydroconsult, an engineering firm
hired to consult on the OCP design for river navigation, acknowledges making ad-hoc
adjustments to the OCP river route, as new information and conditions necessitated. The
state did not oversee the construction process, essentially devolving responsibility to
private companies.
Other secondary impacts noted by Weemaels have been addressed by the state
and industry, although not necessarily in a manner acceptable to the TAN. For example,
the Fundación Jatun Sacha was subcontracted by the OCP Consortium to direct its
Proyecto Revegetación [Revegetation Project]. The Fundación collected information
about the areas to be destroyed by OCP construction, and grew vegetation indigenous to
these areas in greenhouses for later replanting.95 This strategy can neither repair damage
to the ecosystem and the environmental services it supports nor pretend to account for all
of the plant and animal species that will be endangered or driven into extinction; yet, this
remediation was surely an unprecedented nod in the direction of conservationists,
whatever its purpose or design.
Among the more notable TAN successes was its effect on state policy providing
for the protection of Yasuní National Park. Scientists Concerned for Yasuní (SCY)
learned from satellite imagery in 2005 that Petrobras had begun construction on an illegal
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access road in the buffer zone (of primary forest) of the Yasuní National Park. The SCY’s
alarm at the prospect of a Yasuní access road was motivated by environmental concerns,
like logging, that transcend the immediate impact of the road itself. Yasuní is a nationally
protected area, an UNESCO BioSphere and the earth’s most biodiverse forest.96 Finer
sounded the alarm to the international community and claimed that it ought to oppose the
road since it would “transect the territory of the Chiru Isla Quichua community living
along the Rio Napo, and would enter the ancestral territory of the Huaorani, possibly
even impacting an uncontacted community.”97 SCY’s letter-writing campaign to protect
the roadless integrity of Yasuní achieved positive results under the recently-instated
President Alfredo Palacio and his appointee, Environment Minister Anita Alban. Acting
on information provided by SCY, Alban notified Petrobras in 2005 that it did not have
governmental authorization to construct the road. Alan cited “the lack of consideration of
access alternatives that would minimize impact.”98 In response, Petrobras sued the state
for access; the lawsuit was rejected by the courts and Petrobras agreed in 2006 to adopt
SCY’s recommendation to access its concession within Yasuní by helicopter.
Despite this small success, the state has generally supported policies that have
significant secondary environmental impact. It became a member of the World Trade
Organization in 1996 with hopes of attracting private foreign investment and expanding
export markets.99 In further preparation for increased oil production, the state, acting
through CEPE, initiated three rounds of bidding for permits to newly established
concession areas. Although all of these concessions were, at least partially, within
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protected biodiverse areas, the state maintained that its constitutional right to subsurface
resources enjoyed legal priority over environmental considerations.
Such controversial state policy might have been facilitated by continuing attacks
on the validity of linkages between indirect environmental and human health impacts
resulting from hydrocarbon activity. For example, while Texaco does not deny its
environmental practices, as they are outlined in Aguinda v Texaco, the company holds
that there exists no proven link between its practices and the negative impacts on human
and environmental health. Texaco also mobilized an epistemic community in support of
its position, but this strategy backfired when it was revealed that health workers from
many countries had “signed a statement excoriating Chevron for buying full-page ads in
Ecuador's major newspapers, in which paid scientific consultants cast doubts on studies
linking oil development to adverse health effects in the Amazon.”100
The World Bank recently implemented the Environmental Management Technical
Assistance Project (PATRA), which aims to support the MEM in developing “detailed
environmental procedures, criteria, limits, and EIA guidelines for the petroleum sector”
and strengthening its environmental assessment capacities.101
This effort to specify and codify policy is a step in the right direction, although it
is a retroactive policy as far as the OCP campaign is concerned. In the end, it would seem
that OCP campaign did appear to enjoy some success in its efforts to influence the
dialogue about the pipeline project. However, on closer examination, few of its
accomplishments are concrete gains. In fact, revegetation projects and other similar
projects flowing from the state and the industry could be interpreted as aggressive efforts
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to co-opt the language of the network, thereby deflecting criticism and neutralizing the
networks’ claim to moral authority.

Analysis.
The TAN was in a position of strength at the beginning of the OCP debate.
Recalling Keck and Sikkink’s independent variables, it can be said that the OCP
campaign enjoyed extraordinary advantages: broad horizontal links, an enormous virtual
audience, important international allies, effective framing and so on. However, a
scrupulous application of the authors’ approach requires mention of the internal
challenges to network cohesion, and a faithful critique of Keck and Sikkink’s formulation
begs a discussion of the authors’ limited portrait of TAN actors and their relationships.
The authors treat TAN actors in static terms: they are either international or
national, either fully collaborating or not. Empirical findings from the Ecuadorian TAN
case show that this leaves much to be desired. For example, what role was played by an
organization known as COICA (Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the
Amazon Basin)? Created in 1992 by a number of indigenous movements from nine South
American countries, and aimed at promoting indigenous claims to land and autonomy,
COICA was an international-level actor during the OCP era. As such, it represented a
number of national movements that were variously integrated in their respective domestic
political landscapes, and interacted directly with actors at both national and international
circuits. It is not clear how this entity fits into Keck and Sikkink’s conceptual map of
TANs, since its members were simultaneously the recipients and the protagonists of TAN
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activism, and since COICA, as an organization, interacted with both TAN actors from the
national and international level.
The horizontal and vertical interactions of COICA were important to its role in
the creation of the Ecuadorian TAN. In its structure and stated goals, the organization
represented national-level actors who championed indigenous rights. In this capacity, it
was the creator and catalyst of a new campaign strategy that was quickly adopted on a
global level; COICA was the first entity to publicly call for and achieve progress towards
the strategic marriage of indigenous rights and conservationist campaigns.102 In a 1989
letter addressed “To the Community of Concerned Environmentalists,” COICA stated
that indigenous peoples of the Amazon and environmental activists were natural allies, as
both sought to preserve the Amazonian rainforest. The letter called for collaboration in
order to “guarantee the future of the Amazon Basin, not only for our peoples, but also for
humanity.”103
The letter and its declarations, commonly known as the Two Agendas, launched a
new partnership and activist campaign strategy. The collaboration was formalized in
May of 1990 when COICA hosted the First Amazon Summit Meeting Between
Indigenous Peoples and Environmentalists, which concluded with the signing of the
Declaration of Iquitos.104 In the following decade, numerous strategies for effective
collaboration were published and discussed by both actors, and the support of the donors
- then mostly private foundations and some multilateral agencies - was secured. It seemed
then that, as stated in the World Wildlife Federation’s 1996 Principles and Guidelines on
Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas, “there is no inherent conflict
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between the objectives of conservationists and indigenous peoples.”105
Challenging such statements are several high-profile, intra-network disputes that
point to some degree of organizational and ideological incoherence within the TAN. The
problems inherent in attempting to fuse distinct goals were exemplified by the
international non-governmental organization (INGO) scandal of 1990 in which

representatives of two U.S.-based non-governmental organizations, the National
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Cultural Survival, met in secret with
representatives of Conoco, in an effort to work out a compromise solution that
would allow Conoco to proceed with exploration while providing some protection
for the environment.106

These organizations promoted their own pragmatic agendas. Since they were
convinced that that oil extraction was destined to continue it seemed prudent to
collaborate with industry actors in order to gain some control over the environmental
outcomes. What they proposed was a trade of sorts: in return for the ‘green stamp’ that
Conoco sought from the NRDC, the company would establish a conservation fund that
would be placed under the management of Conoco and the “independent policy makers,
nominated by NRDC, Conoco, and other participating groups.”107 In addition, the NRDC
representatives offered a survey of the positions that they suspected the other
environmental NGOs and INGOs might adopt in response to the Conoco compromise,
and strategized about how best to soften opposition and manufacture support.
The content of this meeting was leaked to the international community and a
significant fall-out followed. Many indigenous network activists, who focused their
efforts on securing a moratorium on oil development activity rather than simply
105
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managing environmental impact, felt betrayed.108 In an ironic twist, the bad press
prompted Conoco to withdraw completely from Ecuador; of course, the void created by
its departure was soon filled by another oil company, Maxus, which was less interested to
committing itself to environmental management compromises.109 The end result
constituted a net loss for all of the Ecuadorian TAN activists.
Clearly, actors from the environmental and human/indigenous rights arenas
brought to the campaign a number of compatible yet distinct concerns. Despite on-going
collaboration, the strategies of the two activist groups occasionally reflected ideological
differences, sometimes to the detriment of collective efforts and campaign efficiency.
Were these difficulties fatal to campaign outcome? Although Keck and Sikkink’s writing
does not indicate how the degree to which internal problems might impact network goals
can be assessed, they do emphasize the importance of the public’s perception of network
activists. In fact, the criteria ‘transparent relationships among activists’ is included in one
of their independent variables. Is it possible that the network’s internal fissures were to
blame for the negative outcome of the OCP campaign? Was this episode but one instance
in the long history of the Ecuadorian TAN or should it be interpreted as a symptom of the
network’s internal weakness?
Moving beyond the specifics of the Ecuadorian case, Mato provides us with good
reason to always investigate the goals of the INGOs involved in any TAN. He explains
that the funding matters, since it causes INGOs to become dependent on the state that
supports their existence and thereby creates incentives for them to represent their
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sponsor’s concerns.110 Similarly, Chapin reports that INGO loyalties, goals and strategies
vary with shifts in funding sources. He finds that, since the 1990s, private donors and
foundations have been displaced by corporate and bilateral or multilateral agencies as the
principal sources of INGO funding. This is most true for “the Big Three,” as Chapin
refers to them: The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Federation, and Conservancy
International.111 Concomitant to the change in funding sources was a “strategic shift” in
INGO behavior; increasingly, large INGOs are territorial and antagonistic in their
dealings with one another, dismissive of their Third-World “partners,” and given to
compromise with their donors.112
Chapin notes that the previous efforts to collaborate with affected indigenous
peoples, were also abandoned in the course of this restructuring of priorities and funding,
as conservationist organizations realized that it was not in their financial interests to
support indigenous strategies of resistance, which were often economically disruptive and
physically violent in nature and frequently aimed at the organizations’ “funding
partners.”113 In justifying their decisions to disconnect from the indigenous rights
campaigns in favor of maintaining supposedly “apolitical” positions, the Big Three have
issued statements that call into question the wisdom of their previous efforts to promote
“native stewardship,” arguing instead that “once indigenous peoples are given tenure to
their lands, there is no assurance that they will work to conserve their biodiversity.”114 In
and beyond Ecuador, the dual-issue campaign uniting indigenous and environmentalist
activists is fragile; yet in Ecuador it did not break down, but instead was reconfigured
110
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along ideological lines.
Furthermore, despite internal problems, it was certainly during the OCP era that
the network was seemingly at its largest and most dense, and therefore in its most
powerful position relative to the target state. In 2003, Martin found that there were “over
200 NGOs (national and transnational) working in the Ecuadorian Amazon …”115 Of
course, only provisional conclusions can be drawn from such data under the formulation
of Keck and Sikkink. Taken together, network density and size constitute the fourth of
Keck and Sikkink’s independent variables affecting campaign outcome. Of all the
elements of the authors’ TAN theory, this is by far the most unspecified. The authors do
not contextualize either term, leaving the reader to wonder what constitutes a ‘large’ or
‘dense’ network. Keck and Sikkink also do not establish a threshold of sufficiency for
either concept. Therefore, while it is easy to claim that the Ecuadorian TAN was at its
largest during the OCP era or to count INGOs, it is not possible to apply Keck and
Sikkink’s formulation to establish whether the TAN was sufficiently large or dense to
influence the campaign outcome. Methodologically speaking, these terms pose a great
challenge to a case study application of Keck and Sikkink’s formulation.
Density relates to the ties that exist between members of any single TAN.
However, it is unclear which types of ‘ties’ are necessary or sufficient or both for
effective campaigning. The scholarly community has reacted quite strongly to the use of
this slippery terminology, particularly as it is used to describe an independent variable.
The most common critique holds that it is necessary for theoretical purposes to specify
the numbers and qualities of these ties. For example, Tarrow and McAdam find that the
nature of ties within a network determines the manner in which a campaign is projected
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from the domestic sphere into the transnational arena. They find that there are two
distinct paths that this projection, or “scale shift” can occur, following from two
mechanisms of projection that the authors refer to as relational diffusion and brokerage.
The former involves the
transfer of information along established lines of interaction, while brokerage
entails information transfers that depend on the linking of two or more previously
unconnected social sites. We argue that while diffusion is the more common route
because it uses existing identities and ties and facilitates emulation, when borders
are to be crossed and distant social actors brought together, brokerage is the more
likely mechanism . . . .116

Thus, the authors emphasize that the presence or absence of existing ties within a
network can impact the manner in which a campaign is made transnational. This is of
significance for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Tarrow and McAdam
find a correlation between the route taken to the transnational arena and the outcome of
network activism.117
Tarrow and McAdam also briefly mention a variant of the first mechanism, one
they call non-relational diffusion, meaning “the transfer of information by means of
impersonal carriers, such as the mass media.”118 They explain that, while they think that
such a pathway is a “common and important component of scale shift that has been
woefully understudied by movement scholars,” they decline to discuss it since their
research program concerns the way in which “movement actors facilitate scale shift.”119
This is unfortunate since mass media, particularly the internet, was extremely important
to the development of the OCP campaign.
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Lance Bennett cautions against theories of network density and organization that
do not factor in the use of “social technologies” like widely available open source
applications on the internet. In contrast to Tarrow and McAdam’s conceptualization of an
impersonal mass media, Bennett writes that the term social technology indicates that it is
not only the technology itself, but also its social dimensions that together facilitate scale
shift.120 Bennett finds that virtual networks are in fact more personal and better defined
by interpersonal ties than are the traditional NGO-based networks. He supports this
argument by stating that virtual networks are less centralized, and therefore more reliant
on the individual activist; this means that there is less need to censor radical opinions in
order to allow an organization to present a moderate, public-friendly image. Bennett also
makes the excellent point that the persons who have contributed the most to the
development of alternative mass media are also likely those who were “least likely to
have a voice in conventional media channels.”121 Since virtual networks do not require
network ties with traditional mass media formats, but only the technological capability to
mount an internet campaign, it appears that there is a need to theoretically redefine the
value of network density or, at the least, to explore whether strategic ties, for example to
the conventional mass media, are inclusive or exclusive forces within networks.
Clearly, Bennett does not view the internet as yet another activist tool, having the
same theoretical value as other mass media. In fact, he finds that, “more than amplifying
the mobilizing capacities of organizations, application of social technologies are
beginning to transform organizational forms,” integrating so-called hyper-organizations,
or internet-based networks, with the more traditional forms described by Keck and
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Sikkink.122 In essence, he advocates for a new theory of transnational activism that
accounts for the intersection of these two groups, and for the possibility that such
interaction will produce a hybrid organization that is, in practice and in theory, an unique
entity.
The debate over organizational definition and form is actually concerned with
best to maximize density in order to achieve access to the international system: via a
decentralized virtual network, the loose and fluid network described by Keck and
Sikkink, a strictly institutionalized framework, or some combination thereof? Keck and
Sikkink envisioned an organizational structure allowing for fluid relationships between
NGOs and INGOs of all sizes. Rather than developing institutionalized patterns of
interaction, these network actors would collaborate on an as-needed basis, depending on
the issue at hand. They write that “despite the differences between domestic and
international realms, the network concept travels well because it stresses fluid and open
relationships among committed and knowledgeable actors . . .”123 Quoting Walter Powell,
an organizational theorist, the authors claim that “networks are ‘lighter on their feet’ than
hierarchy.”124
Several arguments in favor of institutionalized relationships have surfaced in
counter to this claim. Most of these hold that institutions are more efficient than loose
networks since institutionalization enhances a network’s access to the international
system. This access facilitates the flow of resources and information, providing a
mechanism for inter-network disputes, enhancing network legitimacy and ensuring its
inclusivity, and reducing the effects of asymmetrical power relationships among network
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actors. Reduction of transaction costs is obviously important to the longevity and success
rate of network activism. Also interesting is the suggestion that network might benefit
from providing channels for democratic conflict resolution. Recalling earlier discussion,
it is clear that Keck and Sikkink have adopted a limited and somewhat rosy
characterization of network activists and their relationships; channels for intra-network
dispute resolution might contribute to the success rates of TAN campaigns by enhancing
legitimacy and transparency.
Advocating for the benefits of the de-centralized virtual network, Bennett predicts
that both traditional NGO-centered and virtual networks will oppose the trend towards
hybrid organizing. As he describes it, the conflict centers around which of the favored
organizational forms, centralized or not, ought to dominate, and how the ideological and
theoretical differences between these forms translate into real and practical dilemmas for
network members.125 For example, a centralized, NGO-based approach draws heavily on
institutional channels in order to achieve favorable terms of access to the international
system, while the virtual networks create new, untapped channels of access, combining
the benefits of large membership with complete flexibility. Such a network is associated
with the additional benefit of computer-supported network measurement capabilities.
Software designed to measure various qualities of virtual social networks has proliferated
as internet-based networking sites have grown in popularity. Application of these
methodological tools might enhance the usefulness formulation of Keck and Sikkink’s
fourth independent variable.
In addition to its hybrid traditional-virtual form, the OCP campaign was also
innovative in its approach to the idea of “material leverage.” Interestingly, it would seem
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that the OCP TAN had the greatest impact on state policy making where it was able to
create a new form of material leverage, rather than relying on traditional sources provided
by pre-existing international actors. For example, the Ecuadorian case suggests that it
might be theoretically useful to investigate the seeming emergence of “boomerang
patterns” that involve domestic, foreign and international courts. In the case of Ecuador,
this pattern is demonstrated by the filing of Aguinda v Texaco in New York; this court’s
eventual decision that the case should be heard in Ecuador; and a subsequent rush of
transnational activism to promote the transparency, independence and authority of the
suddenly famous and certainly overwhelmed Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio. As Kolker
describes it, Aguinda v Texaco represents a “pioneering new paradigm of exporting
American-style environmental class actions.”126
Interestingly, the campaign’s innovative, court-based actions led indirectly to
policy changes by the Ecuadorian government. During the 1990s, liability issues raised in
the course of the initial hearings of Aguinda v Texaco prompted the state to supplement
informal arrangements with formal mechanisms. Thus, the1994 decree Políticas
Ambientales Básicas del Ecuador [Basic Environmental Policies in Ecuador] introduced
the idea that foreign companies ought to “apply the highest standards and requirements of
their home country in their operations in Ecuador, without prejudice to compliance with
Ecuadorian law.”127
The state was further galvanized by the specter of liability when it was proved
that the1998 issuance of remediation certification to Texaco was based on fraudulent soil
samples provided by the company. A flurry of lawsuits followed: the state maintained
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that this evidence annulled Texaco’s release from liability, while Texaco pointed out that
the state had approved its method of sampling and its analysis of the results. At stake in
this on-going legal tug-of-war is the assignment of responsibility for the social and
environmental damages alleged in Aguinda v Texaco. It is entirely possible that the state,
through its enabling policies and the low social and environmental standards of the staterun CEPE, might eventually be punished for ignoring the demands of the OCP campaign.
The potential leverage of class-action torts is significant. The current price tag
attached to Aguinda v Texaco stands at $6.1 billion, yet this suit only addresses damages
sustained by 30,000 indigenous people from a few of tribes. Depending on the outcome
of this suit, the threat of new class action suits could constitute a significant leverage.
Thomasson emphasizes the potential scope of the liability issue, stating that:
Jota, et. al. v Texaco, another class action suit on behalf of 25,000 Peruvians, was
filed a few days after the Aguinda litigation had commenced. . . .The Jota plaintiffs claim
that Texaco’s oil operations in Ecuador also have had an impact in Peru. The Center for
Economic and Social Rights, an NGO based in New York, has found that oil-related
contamination flowed into Peru via the rivers common to the two countries.128
This suit illustrates that not only do environmental problems ignore political
boundaries, but any associated liability might also cross borders. Increasingly, indications
abound that creating leverage through creative applications of international law might
constitute a new TAN strategy. Amazon Watch reports that “other companies recently
targeted by "class action style" environmental litigation in Latin America include Dole
Food, Shell Oil, Dow Chemical, Occidental Chemical, Del Monte Fresh Produce and
Chiquita Brands International.”129 Watts also acknowledges this emerging trend, noting
that “Earthrights International, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), brought charges
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against Unocal arguing that the Yadama pipeline had led to extensive human rights
abuses, specifically rape, death, and the disruption of a local way of life. . . . These
clashes between a global oil industry and a vast transnational human rights advocacy
network have become increasingly commonplace.”130
However, the success of these manufactured forms of leverage is as yet debatable.
For example, the Ecuadorian state demanded that its contract for the construction of the
OCP include a “guarantee payment of all environmental liabilities caused by the pipeline
up to a maximum of $50 million.”131 The OCP Ltd. is also reported to have obtained a
provision in its contract with the Ecuadorian government for three separate insurance
policies, including “An Environmental Damage insurance policy, which covers all
environmental damages resulting from the construction or operation of the pipeline.”132
These measures, establishing and limiting liability, can be seen as a reaction to the
potential liability of the SOTE era. However, they clearly prioritize state and industry
concerns about environmental damage over those of the TAN; this outcome cautions
against the tendency to assume that learning on the part of the target state will promote a
convergence towards a single norm. In the case of Ecuador, the learning process simply
alerted the target to its Achilles’ heal and thereby enabled the continuation of its
offensive behavior. The value of a reactive, legalistic and punitive action strategy is
questionable, and possibly as likely to benefit as to deter the target.
In spite of such grim warnings, the prospect of creating new forms of leverage
grows ever more tantalizing as traditional leverage increasingly fails to produce
meaningful outcomes. The most obvious example of the OCP campaign’s use of
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traditional material leverage was the Goodland Report which supported the World Bank’s
position and caused the WestLB to withdraw its support. This outcome follows perfectly
the boomerang pattern described by Keck and Sikkink: network actors petitioned an actor
from the international scene for assistance, and then used the information generated by
this process to pressure the financial institution (via implicated politicians) to honor its
public commitment to not bankroll infrastructure projects that did not meet World Bank
environmental and social standards.
However, this event is most accurately thought of as a single battle won in the
course of a war; it had little secondary impact on other actors or their policies. The reality
of the international system and the global political economy in particular is that, while it
allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple norms, it favors those orientations that
prioritize capital accumulation. Acknowledging this structural complexity, it is hardly
surprising that the financial impact of WestLB’s departure was easily absorbed by the
Consortium and its financial backers who remained beyond the influence of the TAN’s
demands. To underscore this point, it is worth examining how project financiers were
able to operate freely, safely removed from the arena of contention, even as their OCP
project was heavily criticized.
According to Van Gelder, the OCP project was funded through a combination of
corporate equity and debt financing. The OCP Ltd. contributed US 400 million, or 31%
of the project costs; this was the parent company of OCP Ecuador S.A., the builder of the
pipeline, which included corporate shareholders from seven different countries and was
registered in the Cayman Islands.133 The remainder of the project cost, $900 million, was
secured through loans from “a group of 16 financial institutions from eight countries”
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including nine banks and seven pension funds and insurance companies.134 In order to
reduce investment risk, the financiers established contractual relationships with the OCP
Consortium oil companies; the latter were made to sign 20-year “ship-or-pay” contracts
guaranteeing payment to OCP Ltd. for a specified percentage of pipeline volume capacity
regardless of actual production or transportation rates. The fact that all of these actors are
transnational companies that originate or are based in a dozen countries complicates the
advocacy network’s task.
The financial web, and consequently the network’s challenge, is further
complicated by Ecuador’s 2002 legislation requiring all OCP Consortium companies to
pay a levy of US 1.20 per barrel of oil transported through the pipeline, the revenues from
which are directed into an oil stabilization fund.135 As Van Gelder correctly notes, the
policy makes clear that state “has a direct interest in the construction of the OCP
pipeline.”136 This incentive has been reinforced by the state’s association with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international finance institutions,
particularly in so far as these institutions have predicated future lending to the state on its
willingness to adopt certain economic and environmental policies in support of oil
industry activity in Ecuador. Beginning in 2000, legislation revamped this fund as part of
a series of IMF structural adjustment programs in Ecuador with the eventual result that
70% of all OCP revenues deposited in the fund are committed to servicing the country’s
external debt and an additional 10-20 % are put into an “interest bearing deposit account
held overseas which will be drawn upon only in the event that oil prices fall below a
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benchmark price.”137
A more immediate result of the 2000 Ley de Transformación Económica del
Ecuador [Economic Transformation Law, or Ley Trole I] was to establish legal
provisions for the construction of the OCP.138 Failure to comply with this IMF
requirement would have compromised Ecuador’s ability to receive a pending IMF loan as
well as future loans from international sources at a time when its external debt exceeded
$16 billion.139 Clearly the interests of the state have been shaped by those of its creditors.
Despite their influence, creditors and other international actors are largely absent
from the most direct confrontations involving TAN actors (and from the literature that
investigates these contentious actions) while states are often placed in the center of such
conflict. This may be a result of certain campaign strategies such as establishing short,
causal links and vilifying the target. However, this is not necessarily an effective
approach for two reasons.
First, the state is caught in a vicious cycle of fragmentation, collapse and
reconstitution. For example, Latin Finance noted in 2002 that “During the 30 months it
took to design the financial structure for the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP)
pipeline and find backers for the project, Ecuador went through three presidents and
nearly half a dozen finance ministers, defaulted on its Brady bonds and Eurobonds,
suffered a military coup and adopted the US dollar as its national currency.”140
Furthermore, the state may intentionally cleanse itself of officials who draw fire
from important international actors. For example, Rafael Correa (current President of
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Ecuador) resigned from his post as the Economy Minister in 2005 following intense
national and international scrutiny of his plan to direct a larger percentage of the OCP oil
stabilization fund towards social spending, or more precisely, away from the IMF.141 As
noted previously, such a shifting political character undermines institutional maturation
and frustrates attempts to establish accountability.
Second, a state in a position of compromised sovereignty, such as that in which
Ecuador finds itself, is likely to be incapable of resisting the demands of international
actors holding significant material leverage. The targeted state, caught between mutually
exclusive demands, must weigh the relative significance of a possible loss of legitimacy
against a potentially punitive reaction from the external system. One likely outcome of
this dilemma is exemplified by the OCP case: the state does not challenge its position in
the external political order and relies for continued internal control on its monopoly on
coercive force, engaging its military and police forces to act in the supposed national
interest.
Regardless of case-specific details, it is clear that all states must account for fact
that the international arena is replete with power inequalities that constrain viable options
and promote self-replication. The bottom-line implication for TAN effectiveness and
predictive theorizing is clear: the combination of competing norms and unequal power
structures is certain to challenge and likely to undermine the importance of any form of
leverage, whether moral or material, that a network can expect to gain over a target state.
Finally, even where effective leverage is fully available to a TAN, one can ask
whether outcomes produced by such TAN strategies are meaningful. This line of
argument takes aim at the piecemeal strategy of the TAN campaign by questioning
141
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whether campaign successes (i.e. individual policy changes) can be expected to have a
cumulative impact on the target’s orientation or, more importantly, on the political
structure that supports the target’s offensive behaviors. To couch this point in Keck and
Sikkink’s language, the issue is whether individual campaign successes can truly promote
a shift in norms, such that changes to the target’s policies translate into an adjustment in
its fundamental priorities and self-definition, which in turn contributes to the
consolidation and expansion of particular international norms.
Keck and Sikkink’s static conceptualization of the international system and its
actors did not lead them to comment on these challenges. However, as the idea of
transboundary environmental issues has grown in popularity, other scholars have realized
the importance of addressing the splintered nature of the international arena and the
uneasy coexistence of multiple norms. For example, Sari has contributed to an on-going
discussion of the possibility of creating an international environmental-human rights
ombudsman. Zarsky, advisor to Sari, has presented ten case studies that collectively
demonstrated a need for such an international actor, and detailed a proposal for the
establishment of the position. The development of a central control charged with
efficiently managing and resolving national environmental issues could perhaps assist in
homogenizing the norms that inform the behavior of international actors, with increased
campaign effectiveness deriving from more efficient inter-level articulation as one of the
potential benefits accruing to advocacy networks. Of course, a concentration of control
would likely be a solution most attractive to those actors interested in reinforcing current
structural power relations. A more promising solution would entail the institutionalization
of TAN norms by actors whose interests can only be fully realized within a context that
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prioritizes non-commercial values. In the Ecuadorian example, COICA most closely
resembles such an institution; its experiences warrant close observation by theorists.
In general, it follows from the analysis of the effectiveness of various strategies
practiced by the Ecuadorian TAN and from the wide-ranging visions provided by
scholars that TANs are theoretically capable of pioneering strategies and conceptual
approaches to advocacy that have the potential to encourage new patterns of interaction.
It is not clear that this capability can consistently be translated into action or, assuming
they can be put into practice, whether their individual impacts might be cumulative.
Furthermore, given the potential for organizational change (witness the evolution of
COICA) and the certainty of contextual change (as in the growing popularity of virtual
advocacy), it remains to be seen whether Keck and Sikkink’s formulation will continue to
be relevant to future generations of activists and scholars.
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FINAL DISCUSSION

As promised, this paper has pointed to a number of underlying conceptual
problems. While this exercise was not meant to fully address such concerns, it remains
appropriate at this juncture to gather and summarize these issues for the benefit of present
clarity and future research.
One central theme has been the existence of an international political and
economic structure which prioritizes values that are hostile to environmental preservation
and non-selective respect for social and cultural diversity. This is not meant as an attack
on the capitalist system; indeed, extensive environmental and social damages have been
perpetrated by states of all economic and political stripes. However, the current
international system actively promotes the notion that national development can only be
obtained by the prioritization of unregulated, capitalistic economic policies. The national
interest has been defined in purely economic terms, and the state has been encouraged to
adopt a corporate mindset in service of this supposedly singular purpose. Thus, the state
finds no value in ecological integrity or social harmony that cannot be expressed in
dollars and cents; instead, caring for the environment is regarded as restricting activities
in support of capital accumulation and reducing profits by internalizing costs.
The state’s obligation to earn money has overrun any alternative
conceptualization of state responsibility or purpose, such as that as the guarantor of the
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civil and human rights of its citizens or as the steward of the environment and other
common goods. As a result of this orientation, states are amenable to policies that attract
industry and foreign investment, even where this occurs at the expense of the citizenry
and the national environment. For example, a state might view its unprotected labor
force, environmental haven (weak regulations and lax enforcement) policies and weak or
nonextant environmental agencies as comparative advantages that attract industry and
thereby justify the social or ecological abuses that are written into such policies.142 Most
disturbing is a state’s willingness to violate its own laws or commit its military or police
to the protection of industry; such extreme (yet common) policies effectively constitute a
transfer of political power from state to industry.
Furthermore, where the state in question is located within the Third World, its
tendency towards dependency on resource-intensive development is reinforced by the
economic power structure of the international system. In particular, the unequal
relationship between First and Third World economies favor the former as provider of
capital and technical resources and as the designer of trade and other economic policies.
Bryant and Bailey characterize this imbalanced relationship as one reminiscent of
colonial times, when the ‘progress’ supported by IFIs (International Financial
Institutions) “was measured in terms of trees felled, valleys flooded, minerals extracted
and acreage dedicated to cash crops or cattle ranching.”143 Noting that IFIs promote
structural adjustment programs that encourage states to their view natural resources as
untapped economic reserves, the authors reaffirm that IFI policies result in double
damage: first by lending in support of development projects that have negative
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environmental and social consequences and then by demanding that indebted states make
payment on project loans “... by cashing in natural resources.”144
External debt, resource-intensive development and state dependency on
multinational corporations (for foreign direct investment, technical expertise and
infrastructure development) together result in a self-replicating economic necessity,
prioritization of corporate values, and state complicity in the consequences of
unconstrained industrial activity.145 Once caught in this cycle, a state that abandons
environmentally degrading or socially oppressive development projects risks that
international creditors will remove it from the economic life support system.146 Given
that the external structure demands a state to adopt a corporatist orientation, can
responsibility be assigned to a state? Is there a chance that advocates can impact state
orientation or does the state’s articulation within the international system have a
deterministic effect that renders a target unwilling, if not incapable, of responding to
advocacy? If so, should activists focus on their efforts on First World states or IFIs in
hopes of a trickle-down effect or, as Tarrow might say, a normative cascade?147
First, it is clear that, in theory, a state can select from among a number of
orientations with respect to its citizens and natural environment. The fact that options
exist is demonstrated by empirical evidence of a range of state orientations and
documented by organizations like Transparency International and MAR which conduct
comparative research and construct databases. The availability of alternative orientations
is also a staple concept in theoretical work; for example, Bryant and Bailey find that there
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is a “central paradox in the state’s function,” meaning that a state can and must choose to
act as either the steward or destroyer of the natural environment.148
Second, how can advocates encourage the target state to embrace an orientation
that does not prioritize development above all other values? While the strategies
enumerated by Keck and Sikkink are certainly important and useful, these will be most
effective where they are utilized in order to promote ideas and visions of alternative
realities. The size and economic prowess of a select number of INGOs notwithstanding,
the power of a network comes primarily from its ability to initiate a public dialogue and
to introduce interpretations that diverge from and challenge the official discourse and
logic. The definition of campaign success must be reevaluated: the standard expectation
that multiple policy changes will cause a norm shift is best read in reverse. Recalling the
close association between IFI lending, fraternity of state and industry, and social and
environmental injustice, the thought that a succession of disjunctive policy changes and
uncoordinated advocacy in various “issue areas” might result in wholesale normative
change on the part of the target should be discarded in favor of a holistic approach.
In general, the design of a campaign should flow from an understanding of the
relative position of the target within the external power structure. This variable matters
enormously for campaign outcome since targeting an economically dependent state does
not alter the power imbalances that encourage the state to adopt offensive policies and
since, in such circumstances, looking to the international arena for traditional leverage is
inherently illogical.
These suggestions for improved campaign effectiveness have meaning for the
enhancement of the predictive power of TAN theories. First, the problems of defining,
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measuring and evaluating campaign success should be clarified prior to data collection
and analysis. In order to allow for true comparative research, Keck and Sikkink’s
treatment of success as a campaign-specific and policy-centered variable should be
replaced with a more standardized and meaningful conceptualization. Second, theories
must account for the implications of the unequal power structure of the international
system, or at least offer a theoretical specification and a measurement of target
dependency.
A case study should begin with the widest lens available in order to understand
the target’s position within its larger context; from such an angle, it should be possible to
assess the external risk to the target should it choose to comply with network demands. If
a given risk level does not essentially immobilize the target, then analysis on the state and
sub-state levels may follow. However, where the state is severely constrained by the
external structure then theorists must consider the possibility that no campaign, no matter
its framing choices or density, can impact the orientation of the target unless it also
challenges the larger structure. Clearly, the international dimension should factor
prominently in future transnational advocacy network theory building.
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RESEARCH PROPOSAL

As noted in the literature review, Keck and Sikkink too often resort to
operationalizing actors in static and dichotomous terms. Relying on such broad
conceptualizations surely increases the possibility of broad application of the TAN theory
by allowing for a large universe of relevant cases. However, by undermining specificity
of concept definition in order and thereby increasing generalizability, the authors have
sacrificed predictive power.
The TAN theory assumes that democratic states will react to pressures from
within and without in particular and predictable ways. In fact, Keck and Sikkink’s own
description of the ‘boomerang pattern’ of activism implies that the target state features a
mixture of democratic and undemocratic policies. Thus, their theory demands that the
concept be expanded to encompass more than blanket democracy (or not). A more useful
conceptualization will rely on a number of indicators of the accessibility of the state. To
this end, the democratic nature of a given state might be assessed via indicators of
substate actors’ access to the state, such as:
1) Formal channels for public participation, including a transparent electoral system,
referendums, and procedures for the redress of grievances (i.e. civil and constitutional
courts).
2) Informal channels, including congressional lobbying, civil right to strike and publicly
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demonstrate, and public forums for dialogue between officials and citizens.
Keck and Sikkink acknowledge the importance of international leverage, yet they
do not offer a method whereby the relative importance to the target of various leverages
can be assessed. Ideally, these leverages, which condition the preferences of the target
and thereby its decision-making, should be ranked by their importance to the state; this
could be achieved on a case-specific basis by employing a rational choice modeling of
external pressures and state preferences. However, a generally applicable approach
should also be articulated.
To this end, indicators of state vulnerability should be categorized according to
the nature of the repercussions that the state will suffer should it choose to not respond as
requested. For example, the Ecuadorian state hoped to borrow extensively to fund the
OCP project; the activists worked to tie project funding to international environmental
standards, while the IMF tied all future funding for Ecuador to the completion of the
OCP; the state was able to secure the funds needed for the pipeline project despite the
departure of WestLB; therefore, the repercussions of not complying with IMF pressures
regarding the OCP were more far-reaching than the repercussions for ignoring activist
pressures. Essentially, it is inappropriate to assume that any state will reflexively submit
to international pressure; conversely, it is reasonable to expect that a state will respond to
the incentive structure created by pressures from various international actors. The central
idea here is that different sources and articulations of international pressure should be
expected to have different meanings for the target state and therefore varying impacts on
state responsiveness. The following baseline indicators for assessing state vulnerability
serve as a starting point:
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1) Extensive reliance on external assistance from international actors who tie the terms of
their current and future support or penalties to particular state behaviors and policies.
2) Ratification of international commitments that impose penalties on member states for
violations of their provisions.
3) Signature of international commitments carrying non-compliance penalties; or
ratification or signature of international commitments not carrying non-compliance
penalties.
Hypothesis. Changes to the independent variables necessitate a slight reformulation of
Keck and Sikkink’s hypothesis statement, as follows:
1) A network cannot influence state policy where positive response by the target state to
network pressures carries possible repercussions for the state which outweigh potential
benefits.
2) A network can only succeed where it is sufficiently large and dense to create public
awareness of the campaign and its message.
3) Positive public perception of the campaign (belief in the reliability of the campaign
members and the content of the campaign message) is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for a network to succeed in influencing state policy.
Data Collection. Adoption of the preceding recommendations complicates data
collection. For example, case selection cannot draw from data sets that rely on
democratic procedural minimums to score states as democratic or not. However, data
collection certainly remains possible. There are a number of data sets that can be used as
a sample pool and might also serve in the development of a case-specific rational choice
model. For example, Transparency International hosts a public-use data set that scores
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citizen and private sector perceptions of state corruption; such data could support a
rational choice preference specification that claims that substate activists are unlikely to
expect that they can influence their state, and therefore are prone to seek external
alliances. Reporters Without Borders hosts a ‘Worldwide Press Freedoms Index’ that
measures press freedom from state intervention; this data could be used to support an
argument about the lack of informal venues for citizen participation and expression. The
United Nations, a body that frequently sponsors international agreements, publishes lists
of state members to international agreements and explanations of relevant noncompliance penalties. A number of accessible sources, including the multilateral financial
institutions, publish information related to the external debt and other factors impacting
the national economy. Inter-state trade information is also widely available.
Measurement of Network Characteristics. As indicated in the literature review,
researchers have expressed substantial frustration with the methodological challenges of
measuring the size and density of a transnational network. The difficulty is quite clearly
inherent in the task.
The crucial problem is the difficulty of establishing a valid measure of ‘density.’
This is partly caused by the vagueness of Keck and Sikkink’s terminology; some scholars
have interpreted density to mean the number of contact points (interactions) between
actor1 and actor2, while others find that counting contact points without establishing the
frequency or extent of actor interaction. An ideal operationalization of the ‘density’
variable should interrogate the nature of network members’ interaction. A case-specific
approach might utilize a survey designed to measure interaction quality. Survey questions
might investigate whether actors share their human and financial resources, whether there
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actors are aware of a hierarchy among them, or how contact was initially established or
sustained over time.
However, a more generally useful approach is necessary. Two pragmatic
measurements, one each for the virtual and the face-to-face network dimensions, can
guide the development of an approach with broader utility. To measure the latter, the
presence of at least one ‘umbrella organization,’ or voluntary grouping of many
organizations into a single unit, is an excellent indicator of the presence of a network.
Furthermore, the coverage (or number and diversity of the groups that are represented by
the umbrella organization) provides a measure of complexity and density.
The virtual dimension is an important aspect of any contemporary transnational
network, and one completely ignored by Keck and Sikkink. The internet presents unique
challenges to and opportunities for the measurement of network density and size. One
solution known as “link analysis” developed out of network analysis. Essentially, this
method relies on those internet search engines, including Google, that are designed to
rank search result pages according to “how many links point to the page.”149 Thompson
explains that the number of links to any given page is an indicator of its importance to
other on-line users and pages. Therefore, link analysis suggests that the ranking of the
returns on a Google search is indicative of the density of connections to that page. Larson
sums up the argument by stating that
Social network analysis holds great potential for identifying and analyzing social
phenomena that might otherwise not be visible. Its most enduring contributions make use
of a fundamental assumption that things are better understood in relation to other things
in their environment. That is, rather than hoping to uncover the essence embodied by an
entity B whether person, group, or society B SNA looks for meaning in the relations
between entities.150
149
150

Thompson, 60.
Emirbayer in Larson, 4.
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Conclusions. This study has established that Keck and Sikkink’s formulation did not
offer substantial predictive value in the case of the Ecuadorian OCP TAN. Empirical
application and theoretical debate support the conclusion that this theoretical weakness
stems from a superficial treatment of the international structure in which all states are
embedded. It therefore seems misguided and unreasonable to wholly assign either blame
or credit for a campaign outcome to the network itself, as is the tendency in the relevant
literature.
It is not necessary to completely abandon Keck and Sikkink’s original
formulation. It is far more valuable to problematize and expand on the authors’ original
independent variables so that these become more useful indicators of the complexity of
the international system and enhance the ability to theoretically account for a wider range
of variation on the dependent variable. All instances and outcomes of transnational
activism are complicated by network interaction with the larger system that is
characterized by uneven distributions of power. Theories of transnational advocacy
should direct attention to the possible impacts of this interaction on advocacy campaign
outcomes. Furthermore, it is possible to access data in support of the expanded research
design making this a viable alternative design. If successful, the research proposed herein
might enhance the predictive power of Transnational Action Network theory.
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APPENDIX:
ACRONYMS

CEPE

CODIGEM

Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana
Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation
Corporación de Desarrollo e Investigación Geológico-Minero Metalurgica
Corporation for Geological-Mining-Metallurgical Research and Development

COICA

Coordinador de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica
Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin

CONAIE

Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
Nacional Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador

DIGEMA

Direccion General de Medio Ambiente
General Directorate of the Environment

DINAMA

Dirrecion Nacional de Medio Ambiente
National Directorate of the Environment

ESMAP

Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (World Bank Group)

GEF

Global Environment Facility

IERAC

Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización
Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform and Colonization Institute

MEM

Ministerio de Energía y Minas
Ministery of Energy and Mines

MMA

Ministerio de Medio Ambiente
Ministry of the Environment

OCP

Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado
Heavy Crude Pipeline

SCY

Scientists Concerned for Yasuní
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SMA

Subsecretaria de Medio Ambiente
Subsecretary of the Environment

SOTE

Sistema de Oleoducto Trans-Ecuatoriano
Transecuadorian Pipeline System
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